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ALL'S NOT FAIR IN ART AND WAR: A LOOK AT THE
FAIR USE DEFENSE AFTER ROGERS v. KOONS*
Willajeanne F. McLean*
Art is up for grabs.'
INTRODUCTION
Consider this: "Wilma" has an idea for a painting-a col-
lage of images from the contemporary art world. She decides to
feature the artist Jeff Koons's aluminum bunny rabbit, puppy
and vacuum cleaner,2 and add to the collage a loaf of sliced
bread. Using an optical scanner, she scans pictures of the
items which are readily available from museum catalogs and
magazines. Wilma arranges the design on her computer and
sends a completed copy to a company that will create the pic-
ture for her. The finished picture looks just like the scanned
images; yet she has combined the images in a "new" way. She
exhibits this finished work with much success. It is certainly
an appropriation,3 but is it an infringement of copyright as
960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut Law School. I am
indebted to John B. Koegel, Esquire for taking the time to discuss with me the
various issues involving the clash of copyright law and appropriation in general,
and the Koons case in particular. I acknowledge with gratitude the helpful
comments and criticisms of Peter Bloom, Rosemary Coombe, Sara Cox and Terry
Tondro on earlier drafts of this Article. Thanks to my research assistant, Tamsin
Shoults, for her excellent assistance in the preparation of this Article.
Jeff Koons, quoted in Tony Parsons, Art Without Shame, DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Apr. 4, 1992, at 101.
2 With the exception of the "sliced bread," the items that my hypothetical
artist would use in her painting have all been exhibited by Jeff Koons. Rabbit,
also known as the Brancusi Bunny, was exhibited in his 1986 'Statuary" show;
Puppy was exhibited in 1992; and the vacuum cleaners, New Shelton Wet/Dry
Doubledecker, were exhibited in 1981.
' Appropriation is an artistic strategy or technique that blurs the distinction
between fakes and originals. It has also been defined as a "twentieth century
manifestation of an aesthetic strategy which aims for the viewer to react to the
work with the heart thumping immediacy of real-life events rather than with the
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well? Were 'Wilma" to be charged with copyright infringement,
it is likely that she would lose the suit even if she argued that
her use was "fair;" that is, that her appropriation of Koons's
work was a critical comment about his work, his philosophy
and the current banality of art in society.4
In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that an artist's work is not "up for grabs" until the
artist has granted prior permission for such appropriations.5
The court affirmed the district court's findings that Jeff
Koons's "use"6 of Art Rogers' photograph, "Puppies," to make
his sculpture "String of Puppies" was a (mis)appropriation of
Rogers' work. Koons's principal argument against a finding of
copyright infringement, which the Second Circuit rejected, was
the copyright doctrine of "fair use." Part I of this Article con-
siders the fair use doctrine and the requirements for making a
fair use defense. Part II then considers the technique of Ap-
propriation, its place in the current art world lexicon and its
clash with copyright laws. Part III next reviews the Second
Circuit's Rogers v. Koons decision, and critically examines the
Second Circuit's application of the fair use factors. Part III
argues that those factors are unwieldy and even anachronistic
when applied to copyright infringements in the visual arts. It
also contends that the court failed to articulate a standard by
which post-modern artists such as Jeff Koons can create art
desiccated response often experienced by those for whom going to museums is a
dreary cultural duty." I. Michael Danoff, Jeff Koons, in CATALOG OF MUSEUM OF
CONTEMPORARY ART 16 n.27 (1988). For a discussion of Appropriation, see infra
notes 60-106 and accompanying text. When discussing Appropriation as an artistic
school of thought, the "A" will be capitalized.
' Fair use is an affirmative defense to a finding of copyright infringement. See
discussion of fair use, infra notes 14-59 and accompanying text.
' Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365
(1992). Even more recently, Koons has been found liable for copyright infringement
in two other cases, stemming from the same "Banality" show. See Campbell v.
Koons, No. 91 Cir. 6055, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3957 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993); and
United Features Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
6 Jeff Koons objected to the court's usage of "copied" when applied to his ap-
propriation of Rogers' photograph. See Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 477
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Koons prefers to avoid the verb 'copied.'"). The word "copy" has
two possible meanings in copyright law: (1) to duplicate an original; or (2) to imi-
tate an original by using it as a model. See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W.
LUNDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT 146, 147 (1991) (noting that the 1976
Copyright Revision Act uses the second definition in limiting the rights of copy-
right owners' protection for sound recordings).
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without the specter of lawsuits hanging like the sword of Dam-
ocles over their heads and suggests an alternative standard for
evaluating copyright infringement in the visual arts.
I. FAIR USE
Fair use is the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright.'
Under the powers granted to it by the United States Con-
stitution, Congress may secure to authors and inventors exclu-
sive rights in their writings and inventions.' The stated pur-
pose for this monopoly grant was to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts.' It has been recognized, however,
that such rights,"0 if unlimited, "would stifle the very creativi-
ty that copyright laws were designed to foster."1 Thus, the
courts created an equitable remedy-the doctrine of fair use, 2
" Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939); see Linda
J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1544 n.58
(noting that the quotation from Judge Learned Hand's opinion is repeated in near-
ly every major treatise, case book or law review article on the subject of fair use).
' Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution provides
Congress with the power "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (copyright law was "intend-
ed . . . to grant a valuable, enforceable right to authors, publishers, etc., .. 'to
afford greater encouragement to the production of literary . . . works of lasting
benefit to the world') (quoting Washingtonian Co. v. Pearson, 396 U.S. 30, 36
(1939)).
10 17 U.S.C. § 106 states in pertinent part:
[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do
and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lend-
ing;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial graphic or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to dis-
play the copyrighted work publicly.
n See Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co.,
621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (the doctrine of fair use allows courts "to avoid the
rigid application of the copyright statute").
12 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (adjudi-
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which in certain circumstances allows one to use another's
copyrighted work without infringing upon the copyright. 3
Fair use has been defined as "[a] privilege in others than
the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstanding the
monopoly granted to the owner."" Yet such a use also has its
limits: it must be creative and inventive and result in an ad-
vancement of learning.'5 The judicially created doctrine of fair
use, which was codified as section 107 of the Copyright Act of
1976, delineates four factors to be considered when determin-
ing whether a "use" is a fair one."
cating a dispute over rights in the writings of George Washington). As articulated
by Justice Story, the standard to be used in deciding questions of copyright in-
fringement required a "look to the nature of the objects of the selections made,
the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use
may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects of the
original work." Id. For a history of the development of fair use in the United
States, see WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 18-64
(1985).
13 The defense of fair use only comes into play once plaintiff has made a show-
ing of defendant's copying and the existence of substantial similarity between the
two works. The term "fair use" has been used to represent, interchangeably, a use
which is non-infringing or one that is infringing, but exempt. See Thomas R. Leav-
ens, In Defense of the Unauthorized Use: Recent Developments in Defending Copy-
right Infringement, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 6 (1981) (discussing the doc-
trine of fair use). See generally Elsemere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co.,
482 F. Supp. 741, 743-44 (S.D.N.Y.) (although copied portion of copyrighted song
was substantial, it constituted a non-infringing fair use), affd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d
Cir. 1980).
" Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). Nonetheless, copyright protection is only
available where the expression of the idea is copied, and not where the idea is
copied. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988), infra note 30.
" See generally New Era Publications Int'l., Aps. v. Holt, 695 F. Supp. 1493,
1499 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("[Clertain forms of copying of artistic creation are indispens-
able to education, journalism, history . . . ; the statute ... allows latitude in
appropriate circumstances for copying of protected artistic expression and exempts
such copying from a finding of infringement"), affd, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990). But see Brian R. Landy, Comment, The Two
Strands of the Fair Use Web: A Theory for Resolving the Dilemma of Music Paro-
dy, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 227, 231 (1993) ("fair use does not require that the use be
creative or productive").
1" 17 U.S.C. § 107 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
The fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in
copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section,
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (includ-
ing multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a
[Vol. 59: 373
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The first factor calls for an analysis of the purpose and
character of the use. Under this requirement, a court must
determine if the use is for the purpose of comment or criti-
cism."8 For example, parody is generally considered to fall
within this category. 9 Additionally a court must consider
whether the use is for commercial or nonprofit educational
purposes." Although it appears that Congress intended com-
mercial or nonprofit educational purposes to be significant in
but not conclusive of the determination of fair use,2' courts
tend to view commercial benefits redounding to the user as
rendering the use "unfair."22 This presumption of unfairness,
however, is a rebuttable one.'s
The second factor involves an inquiry into the nature of
the copyrighted work.24 Here the courts determine if the copy-
righted work is primarily factual in its nature or a work of
creativity.' If the copyrighted work is considered primarily
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered
shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use
if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
17 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
I d.
1' For a discussion of parody, see infra note 160-71 and accompanying text.
2" 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
21 H.R. REP. NO. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679 ("the commercial or nonprofit character of an activity,
while not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and should be weighed along
with other factors in fair use "decisions").
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451
(1984) (holding that every commercial use of copyrighted material was presump-
tively unfair); Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91,
97 (2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting the defendant's use and characterizing it as "chiseling
for personal profit"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978). But see Maxtone-Graham
v. Burtschaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1262 (2d Cir. 1986) (§ 107(1) should not be read as
requiring a clear cut choice between "commercial" and "nonprofit," as such reading
would virtually obliterate "fair use"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987).
2 See generally Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. New Regina Corp.,
664 F. Supp. 753, 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (where the use has a commercial purpose,
the presumption of unfairness can be rebutted).
24 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1988).
" See generally Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) ("in general, fair
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factual, then public interest in, and access to, the facts may be
considered paramount,26 and wider latitude is afforded to
those who appropriate factual parts from the work." If the
copyrighted material is determined to be creative in nature,
such as literary or pictorial works," then the author is given
more protection from another's unauthorized use.2 1 This dis-
tinction is consistent with copyright law, since facts and ideas
are not per se protectable; only the expression of the idea or
arrangement of the facts is protectable. ° The rationale for
this distinction between factual and creative work may lie in a
perception of public benefit.3 ' It is a widely believed that the
public dissemination of facts is more significant than the dis-
semination of those expressions contained in fictional or cre-
use is more likely to be found in factual works than in fictional works"); Maxtone-
Graham, 803 F.2d at 1263 (Second Circuit found fair use by the defendant of
excerpts from the plaintiffs book because the work was "essentially factual in
nature").
26 See Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1050 (the scope of the fair use doctrine
"is undoubtedly wider when the information conveyed relates to matters of high
public concern").
27 See id. at 1049 ("the risk of restraining the free flow of information is more
significant with informational work, the scope of permissible fair use is greater").
See generally 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §
13.05[A], at 13-77 (1992) ("Copyright protection is narrower, and the corresponding
application of the fair use defense greater, in the case of factual works . . .");
Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, 749 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1984) ("the scope of the
fair use defense is broader when informational works of general interest to the
public are involved than when the works are creative products").
2 See Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding that
Rogers' photograph was a creative work, closely akin to fiction).
' Stewart v. Abend, 863 F.2d 1465, 1481 (2d Cir. 1988), ("a use is less likely
to be deemed fair when the copyrighted work is a creative product"), affd, 495
U.S. 207 (1990). But see Wendy Gordon, Reality as Artifact: From Feist to Fair
Use, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 96 (1992) (while imaginative works are cre-
ative, they may also be comprised of factual components, which need to be widely
available for public dissemination).
70 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) which states:
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of author-
ship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
21 See generally Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303,
306 (2d Cir. 1966) (finding that fair use determination turns on whether the dis-
tribution of the work would serve the public interest in the free dissemination of
information), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). But see Elliot M. Abramson, How
Much Copying Under Copyright? Contradictions, Paradoxes, Inconsistencies, 61 TEM-
PLE L. REV. 133, 156 (1988) (taking issue with rationales for distinguishing be-
tween factual and creative works).
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ative works." Indeed an author may choose not to display or
publish a work of art or fiction.
In addition to determining the factual or creative nature of
the work, courts also consider whether or not a work has been
published.3 If the work has not been published and is appro-
priated, it is unlikely that such appropriation would be consid-
ered fair use,34 because the author's right to choose the timing
and forum for the debut of her work outweighs the public in-
terest in access to the work prior to its publication. 5
The third factor is a quantitative and qualitative evalua-
tion of the amount of the copyrighted work used.36 Although
there are no concrete guidelines for determining how much
appropriation is too much," a court generally determines
whether or not the taking was reasonable under the circum-
stances." If, for example, the entire work has been repro-
" See generally Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539,
563-64 (1985) ("the law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual
works than works of fiction or fantasy"); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.4 (1984) ("Copying a news broadcast may have a
stronger claim to fair use than copying a motion picture."); Diamond v. Am. Law
Publishing Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1984) ("informational works may be
more freely published under § 107 than those of a creative nature").
'Publication, [as defined by the Copyright Act of 1976,] is the distribution
of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by a sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by a rental, lease or lending. The offering to
distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of
further distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes
publication. A public performance or display of a work does not of itself
constitute publication.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1992).
"' See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 554 ("the unpublished nature of a work is
key, though not necessarily a determinative factor," tending to negate a finding of
fair use). Congress, however, added a proviso to the statute in October 1992 stat-
ing that just because a work is unpublished does not in itself bar a finding of fair
use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. IV 1992).
" See generally Wright v. Warner, 953 F.2d 731, 737 (2d Cir. 1991) (author's
right to control the first public appearance weighs against a finding of fair use if
the use occurs before its release). Accord Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564; New
Era Publications v. Holt, 873 F.2d 576, 592 (2d Cir. 1989).
3 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
Maxtone-Graham v. Burtschaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (1986) ("There are no
absolute rules as to how much of a copyrighted work may be copied and still be
considered a fair use."); Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d
303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966) (the concept of fair use "is based on reasonableness and
extensive verbatim copying. . . cannot satisfy that standard"), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1009 (1967).
3 See Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz, Liechtenstein, Black, Inc. v.
19931
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duced, it is unlikely a court will make a finding of fair use.39
Moreover, even if the entirety of the work has not been repro-
duced, a court may nevertheless make a qualitative finding
that the use was substantial and "unfair" because the user
appropriated the "essence" of the work.40 In such cases the
user may not defend her (mis)appropriation by demonstrating
that most of her own work was not based upon the copyrighted
work.4' This analysis of qualitative appropriation-that is, a
determination of whether or not the "essence" of the copy-
righted work is taken-ties into the fourth factor:42 the effect
of the alleged infringer's use on the potential market of the
copyrighted work.43
This last factor," which has been held to be the most im-
portant,4" considers whether the work replaces the original
copyrighted work in the marketplace or fulfills the demand for
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (taking
55 seconds of an 89 minute film was not fair use), affd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982). But see Keep Thompson Governor Comm. v.
Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957 (D. N.H. 1978) (15 seconds' use of 3
minute song was fair use).
"' See generally Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1325 (2d Cir.) (re-
viewing the fair use factors and determining that where there has been extensive
verbatim copying or paraphrasing of another's material, there can be no finding of
fair use), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 883 (1989); 3 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 13.05[A],
at 13-80 ("Whatever the use, generally it may not constitute a fair use if the
entire work is reproduced."); Matthew W. Wallace, Analyzing Fair Use Claims: A
Quantitative and Paradigmatic Approach, U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 121,
137 (1992) (noting that "courts sustained a fair use defense only 16.3% of the
time" where the defendant has appropriated all or substantially all of a work).
40 See H. C. Wainwright & Co. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 418 F. Supp.
620, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding that the defendant's use of the plaintiffs stock
market analysis "sucked the marrow from the bone" of the plaintiffs work), affd,
558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
41 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985)
("[A] taking may not be excused merely because it is insubstantial with respect to
the infringing work."); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56
(2d Cir.) ("no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work
he did not pirate"), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
42 See Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1123 (1990) ("as to the relationship of quantity to the market . . . the more taken
the greater the likely impact on the copyright holder's market").
"' 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
44 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
" See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 (the fourth factor is "undoubtedly the
single most important element of fair use"); see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S.
207, 238 (1990) (the fourth factor set forth in statute is "'most important and ...
central fair use factor'") (quoting 3 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 13.05[A], at 13-81).
[Vol. 59: 373
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the original.46 A showing that a substantial (qualitative) tak-
ing would have an impact upon the potential market for the
original work would likely result in a presumption against fair
use."' Conversely, a showing of no market impact might result
in a finding of fair use.4" In determining the market impact of
the use, the court focuses on whether the use diminishes the
potential sale of the original, copyrighted work.4 9 The inquiry
focuses not only focus on the market for the original, but also
on the market for potential derivative works to which the origi-
nal author has conclusive rights.0 Despite the stated signifi-
cance of the fourth factor, however, lawyers have been given no
guidance in determining how much market impairment will
lead to a presumption against fair use.5
"' Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986) (infringement found where
the parody supplanted the market for the original); College Entrance Book Co. v.
Amsco Book Co., 119 F.2d 874, 876 (2d Cir. 1941) (where the defendant's book
met the same demand and market as the plaintiffs book, the defendant's use of
was not fair use).
47 See Leval, supra note 42, at 1123; see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539,
550 (1984) (use by one who cites the most important parts of the copyrighted
work, "with a view ... to supersede the use of the original work, ... will be
deemed in law a piracy." (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)).
" See Leval, supra note 42, at 1123 ("One can imagine secondary works that
quote 100% of the copyrighted work without affecting market potentiaL"); see also
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 599 n.23 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (As the statutory
directive implies, it matters little whether the use is 1 or 100 percent appropriat-
ed expression if the taking ... had no adverse effect on the copyrighted work.").
" See generally H.C. Wainwright & Co. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 418 F.
Supp. 620, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding that market for plaintiffs copyrighted
financial reports was reduced due to publication of the defendant's infringing
work), affd, 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
50 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 ("this inquiry must take account not
only of harm to the original, but also of harm to the market for derivative
works").
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works,
such as translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, trans-
formed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modification which, as a whole, represent an origi-
nal work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
17 U.S.C. § 101.
51 See generally PATRY, supra note 12, at 453-54 (arguing that the factor is so
misunderstood that it permits courts to deny fair use in absence of adverse effect
of the use on the market); see also Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d
1490, 1497 (1984) (holding that notwithstanding defendant's sales in a market in
which the plaintiff did not operate, defendant's use was not fair). But see Leval,
1993]
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Unfortunately, neither case law nor the statute have set
forth a bright line for establishing when a use is or is not
fair.52 Nor does the statute provide guidance regarding the
weighing of the four factors to be taken into consideration.53
Thus, the results in any given case are largely unpredict-
able.54 Nevertheless, the language of the statute makes clear
that an evaluation of fair use cannot be made without address-
ing the four factors.55 Equally unhelpful is the preamble to
section 107 which sets forth illustrative examples of uses that
would not constitute per se infringements. They include, inter
alia, criticism, comment, news reporting and scholarship."
Although such uses might be regarded as fair, a court must
still consider the four statutory factors when making such a
determination.57 The problems of applying the fair use factors,
supra note 42, at 1124-25 (market impairment should not weigh against the user
unless impairment is substantial).
2 See Jay Dratler, Jr., Distilling the Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright
Law, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 233, 235 (1988) ("doctrine has no crisp outlines, no
precise standards and no obvious center or core"); John Shelton Lawrence, Copy-
right Law, Fair Use and the Academy, in FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY: COPYRIGHT
AND THE NEW MEDIA 11 (Shelton Lawrence & Bernard Timbers eds., 2d ed. 1989)
("Cases provide no definitive specifications regarding the limits of fair use.") [here-
inafter FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY]; Leval, supra note 42, at 1106 ("formulations
furnish little guidance").
' See Abramson, supra note 31, at 61 (absence of guidance in weighing the
factors makes the doctrine of fair use conducive to broad judicial discretion).
" See generally Leval, supra note 42, at 1105-06 (1990) (noting that "earlier
decisions (regarding fair use) provide little basis for predicting later ones"); Lloyd
L. weinreb, Fairs Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARv. L. REV.
1137, 1137-38 (1990) (noting that the state of the doctrine of fair use is confused
and disorderly, citing two contradictory Supreme Court opinions, Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. National Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) and Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
" See Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 n.7 (11th Cir.
1984) (statute establishes a minimum number of inquiries that a court must carry
out), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985); Dratler, supra note 52, at 260 ("Congress
intended to replace the witches' brew of equity and ad hoc policy balancing with
more finely refined elixirs, but without curtailing development of the doctrine in
the common law tradition.").
'6 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. IV 1992). These examples are not exclusive. See also
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678, which notes that the examples give an idea of the sort
of activities a court might consider fair use under the circumstances. For example,
parody, which is considered to be a fair use under certain circumstances, is not
mentioned. See generally MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 296
(1989) (parody is not specifically mentioned in the preamble as presumptively fair
but that the categories listed are sufficiently broad to include it).
" See Pacific & Southern, 744 F.2d at 1495 (trial court erred in failing to
[Vol. 59: 373
FAIR USE DEFENSE
particularly when confronted with technologies unanticipated
at the time Justice Story articulated these standards, are wide-
ly recognized. 8 Application of the fair use factors in copyright
infringement cases involving the works of visual art is espe-
cially fraught with difficulties. 9 The next section will briefly
explore the concept of Appropriation as an artistic strategy,
and the legal complications that result when it collides with
copyright claims.
II. THE CLASH OF ARTISTIC APPROPRIATION WITH COPYRIGHT
[T]he writers and artist of the present day will no longer be able to
invent new styles and worlds-they've already been invented; only a
limited number of combinations are possible; the most unique ones
have been thought of already .... [A]U that is left is to imitate dead
styles, to speak through the masks and with the voices of the styles
in the imaginary museum. But this means that... postmodernist
art is going to be about art itself in a new kind of way; even more it
means that one of its essential messages will involve the necessary
failure of art and the aesthetic, the failure of the new, the imprison-
ment in the past.6"
The world is filled to suffocating. Man has placed his token on every
stone. Every work, every image is leased and mortgaged. We know a
picture is but a space in which a variety of images, none of them
original, blend and clash. A picture is a tissue of quotations drawn
from the innumerable centers of culture .... We can only imitate a
gesture that is always anterior, never original. Succeeding the paint-
consider four factors involved in fair use and in concluding that use was neither
productive nor creative).
" See Sigmund Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for Visual, Auditory and
Audiovisual Copyrights: Economic Context, Legal Issues and the Laoc6on Shortfall,
in FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY, supra note 52, at 305 (noting that revolutionary
technological developments have rendered copyright law obsolete).
"' See Jennifer T. Olsson, Note, Rights in Fine Art Photography: Through A
Lens Darkly, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1489, 1490 (1992) ("standard applications of copy-
right law become more complicated when applied to fine art photography"); see
also John Carlin, Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property
Law, 13 CoLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 103, 140 (1988) (arguing for greater flexibility
in the fair use exception when it is applied to artistic appropriation). According to
Carlin, adaptation of copyright in this domain would be consistent with other
adaptations made for other aspects of copyrights not foreseen when the initial
revision of the Copyright Act occurred in 1976. Id.
"' See Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism and Consumer Society, in THE ANTI-
AESTHETIC: ESSAYS ON POSTMODERN CULTURE 111, 115-16 (Hal Foster ed. 1982)
[hereinafter THE ANTI-AESTHETc].
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er, the plagiarist no longer bears within him passions, humors, feel-
ings, impressions, but rather this immense encyclopedia from which
he draws... ."
The two quotations above illustrate the ethos of the pre-
vailing climate for artists working within the postmodern
paradigm." They must create in circumstances where, they
claim, there is truly nothing new under the sun. But they are
not the first to claim that absolute novelty is an impossibility;
claims that all works are necessarily derivative have been
made in copyright law for over a century. 3 Postmodern art-
ists use as source material the "literature" that is omnipres-
ent-the media-produced signs, symbols and images, 4 or they
use pre-existing images in art.' In any case, such artists appropriate.'
" Sherrie Levine, quoted in MAGAZINE OF THE WADSWORTH ATHENAEUM 7
(Spring 1987) and in Paula Marincola, Stock Situations/Reasonable Facsimiles, in
IMAGE SCAVENGERS: PHOTOGRAPHY 24 (Paula Marincola ed. 1982) [hereinafter IM-
AGE SCAVEGERS].
62 Defining postmodernism is like trying to nail gelatin to a wall. For example,
the term "postmodern" has been used to "describe everything from a broad cultural
shift ... to new directions in rock music." Brian Wallis, What's Wrong with this
Picture?, in ART AFTER MODERNISM: RETHINKING REPRESENTATION XVII (Brian
Wallis ed., 1984) [hereinafter ART AFTER MODERNISM]; see Dale Jamieson, The
Poverty of Postmodernist Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 577, 577 (1991) ("if
postmodernism is anything at all it comes in more than thirty-one flavors") (cita-
tions omitted).
See Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436):
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are and can be, few,
if any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original
throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must
necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used be-
fore.
Id. at 619.
" See Jameson, supra note 60, at 112 ("postmodernisms have been fascinated
by that whole landscape of advertising and motels . . .the late show and Grade-B
Hollywood film"); Wallis, supra note 62, at xv ("Typical cultural representations
such as newspaper photographs, films, advertisements ... carry ideologically
charged messages."); see also Danoff, supra note 3, at 16-19 (discussing the impact
the media has had on daily life and observing that "media can seem hyperreal").
6 See Carlin, supra note 59, at 107 (there are two distinct types of references
for postmodern artists: commercial imagery (advertisements) and existing artistic
imagery (others' artistic works)). The appropriated image may be a film still, a
photograph, or a drawing. See Craig Owens, The Allegorical Impulse Toward a
Theory of Postmodernism, in ART AFTER MODERNISM, supra note 62, at 205 (dis-
cussing the link between allegory and contemporary art).
66 Appropriation is a technique "in which one artist takes as her or his own
images, often the extremely well-known images of another." Arthur C. Danto, Nar-
ratives of the End of Art, in ENCOUNTERS & REFLECTIONS: ART IN THE HISTORICAL
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Appropriation is an artistic technique in which artists
copy/borrow/quote 7 elements from another's work.6" In some
cases, the totality of another's work is appropriated, as in some
of the works by Richard Prince, Barbara Krugyr and Sherrie
Levine. 9 Needless to say, Appropriation is not a twentieth
century construct;70 copying is an age-old technique, used in
teaching others how to draw.71  Yet in the hands of
PRESENT 331, 332 (1990) (discussing the use of appropriation in photography)
[hereinafter ENCOUNTERS & REFLECTIONS]; see also Danoff, supra note 3, at 16
(defining Appropriation as "the physical incorporation into art of things not made
by the artist and which, at the time of their being appropriated, are seen as be-
longing more to the realm of life, than of art").
Appropriation is not the only device employed by postmodern artists in their
work. See Abigail Solomon-Godeau, Photography After Art Photography, in ART
AFTER MODERNISM, supra note 62, at 80 (discussing the use of various postmodern
techniques to refute or subvert the concepts of modernist aesthetics). For example,
other techniques include seriality and repetition (a technique whereby an image is
repeated in the same work of art, but with slight modifications), and simulation or
pastiche (a work of art created in the style of another artist, but not a deliberate
forgery of a work of art).
' Some would say "steal." See Constance L. Hays, A Picture, a Sculpture and
a Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1991, at B2 (Art Rogers, commenting on Jeff
Koons's appropriation of his photograph, said, "This is elevating stealing to some
level of art."); see also Carlin, supra note 59, at 104 n.5 ("artistic appropriation is
often termed plagiarism, even by artists engaged in practice"); Olsson, supra note
59, at 1490 ("appropriation-what some would similarly consider stealing").
See generally Marincola, supra note 61, at 5-6 (discussing Appropriation as
an art form).
" See id. at 21-26. See generally David Robbins, Richard Prince: An Interview,
1985 APERTURE 6 (where the artist discusses the technique of rephotography that
he initiated in 1977). For a discussion of Levine's work, see Douglas Crimp, The
Photographic Activity of Postmodernism, OCTOBER 15 (1980) and Gerald Marzorati,
Art in the (Re)Making, 85 ART NEWS 90-99 (1986). For a discussion of Barbara
Kruger, see KIRK VARNEDGOE & ADAi GOPNIK, HIGH AND LOW: MODERN ART AND
POPULAR CULTURE 390 (Kirk Varnedgoe & Adam Gopnik, eds., 1990).
7 See generally Martha Buskirk, Commodification as Censor: Copyrights and
Fair Use, OCTOBER 82, 96 (1992) ("creation of copies and the use of methods of
reproduction [are] hardly new to twentieth-century art"); Carlin, supra note 59, at
108 ("origin of appropriation as . . . [an] aspect of modern art can be traced back
to Monet's "Olympia" [shown in 1865]"); Douglas Crimp, On the Museum's Ruins,
in THE ANTI-AESTHETIC, supra note 60, at 45 (1983) (comparison of Manet's dupli-
cation of pose, composition and certain details of Titian's "Venus of Urbino" for his
"Olympia" with Rauschenberg's photographic reproduction of an original painting
onto a surface that also contains other images.) But see Cathy Curtis, Art Imitates
Art in Exhibit at CSUP, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1991, at F1 ("there is a huge gulf
between 'Old Masters and modern artists' use of visual 'quotes' from other
sources .... [notably] the belief that [modem artists] no longer have 'real' experi-
ence of the world anymore").
72 Remember school art classes and being told to "copy what you see?" I am
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postmodern artists, "copying" has been transformed-it has
become the means for making artistic comment upon or react-
ing to the presence and meaning of pervasive cultural icons.72
For example, Barbara Kruger appropriates advertisement
photographs, generally of women, and adds her own pithy
captions, such as "I SHOP, THEREFORE I AM" or "YOU IN-
VEST IN THE DIVINITY OF THE MASTERPIECE."73 One of
her purposes in using advertisements was to decry and expose
the manipulative seduction of Madison Avenue.74 Yet Madison
Avenue continues to win by coopting, or appropriating the
Appropriation.75 Arguably, then, "advertising serves not so
much to advertise products as to promote consumption as a
way of life."76 Artists who appropriate do so to get their view-
ers to acknowledge the "subtle tyrannies" that the media im-
poses on the public.77 Therefore, Appropriation has become
indebted to John B. Koegel (an attorney) for reminding me of this experience. See
also Olsson, supra note 59, at 1497 n.46 (describing copying as a longstanding
tradition by which artists learn how to paint).
72 See Jameson, supra note 60, at 111 (postmodernisms emerged against the
established forms of high modernism; e.g., the museum, art gallery network and
other cultural institutions); accord Douglas Crimp, supra note 69, at 15
("[p]ostmodernism can only be understood as a specific breach with modernism,
with those institutions which are the preconditions for and which shape the dis-
course of modernism"); Lynne A. Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: Puppies,
Piracy, and Post-Modernism, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1992) (trends in
postmodern art are a reaction to the "formalist ideals of modernism and the aes-
thetics of a media-and image-saturated society . . . "); Craig Owens, The Dis-
course of Others: Feminists and Postmodernism, in THE ANTI-AESTHETIC, supra
note 60, at 57 ("postmodernism is usually treated . . . as a crisis of cultural au-
thority, specifically of the authority vested in Western European culture and its
institutions").
"3 See Hal Foster, Subversive Signs, in RECODINGS-ART, SPECTACLE, CULTURAL
POLITICS 99, 111-15 (1985) (describing Kruger's work); Varnedgoe & Gopnik, supra
note 70, at 390 (containing photographic reproductions of Kruger's work).
" At the same time Kruger comments on the status of women. See Foster,
supra note 73, at 115 (discussing the work of Barbara Kruger as pertaining to the
"discourses of high art and mass culture, of sexual politics on cultural power").
"5 See J.S.G. Boggs, Who Owns This?, 68 CHI.-KENT L.REv. 889 (1993) (discuss-
ing Newsweek's Appropriation of Kruger's style); VARNEDGOE & GOPNIK, supra
note 69, at 390-91 (Kruger's style inevitably became the newest style of main-
stream advertising).
"' See Danoff, supra note 3, at 13, quoting CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE
OF NARCISSISM 137 (1979).
" Id.; see Curtis, supra note 70, at F1 ("the most important work the
appropriationists do is to get us to look at the big picture, in particular, the sub-
tle tyrannies imposed by a media culture"). For example, Jeff Koons's early works,
such as his installations of new, unused vacuum cleaners, focused on issues of
[Vol. 59: 373
FAIR USE DEFENSE
prominent because "it reflects the continual attempt to secure
a position in this culture by physically possessing its endlessly
emerging products," which include those very images and texts
that advertise those products.7"
In addition to reacting to the commodification of society,7"
Appropriationists also question the concepts of originality and
authenticity." Traditionally, originality and authenticity in
art came from the association of the work with its cultural
milieu, copyright law and in the ability to sense the presence
of the artist in the work." Yet in this age of mechanical re-
production, the idea of an "original" has become pass6, even
irrelevant." By "taking" the original and remaking it, the art-
ist shows that the "original" image itself was just a
(re)presentation. 3  In effect, the taking/copying/appropri-
consumerism. See generally BRIAN WALLIS, A PRODUCT YOU COULD KILL FOR 29-31
(discussing the work of consumer artists and suggesting that these artists provoke
questions and introduce humor by their use of new consumer objects); Danoff,
supra note 3, at 10-14 (discussing the works of Koons within the consumerism
tradition).
" Danoff, supra note 3, at 16 ("The act of buying puts us in touch with our-
selves.").
" See generally Martha Buskirk, supra note 70, at 94 (the images that sur-
round us are either linked to the modification of commodities, or are themselves a
form of commodity); Rosemary J. Coombe, Tactics of Appropriation and the Politics
of Recognition in Late Modern Democracies, 21 POL. THEORY 411, 414-15 (1993)
(suggesting that trademarks and other signifiers are the focus of cultural invest-
ments and social inscriptions).
" See Douglas Crimp, Appropriating Appropriation, in IMAGE SCAVENGERS,
supra note 61, at 33 (discussing appropriation and stating that "nlotions of origi-
nality, authenticity and presence ... are undermined by the use of confiscation,
quotation . . . and repetition of already existing images"); Greenberg, supra note
72, at 14 (finding that works using appropriated images "function as direct attacks
on the primacy of originality"); Marzorati, supra note 69, at 91 (1986) (discussing
Sherrie Levine's intent in appropriation to "flatly undermin[e] those most hallowed
principles of art in the modern era: originality, intentions, expression").
81 See Crimp, supra note 70, at 94. ("The presence of the artist in the work
must be detectable; that is how the museum knows it has something authentic.");
Olsson, supra note 59, at 1496 ("In the art world, original tends to mean authen-
tic, a term endowed with spiritual connotations.") (citations omitted).
2 See Rosemary J. Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights,
Postmodern Politics and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 364,
373 (1992) ("This notion of the original, necessary to the idea of authenticity and
to the work's authority, increasingly becomes irrelevant in an age of technical
reproduction."); Rosalind Krauss, The Originality of the Avant Garde: A
Postmodernist Repetition, in ART AFTER MODERNISM, supra note 62, at 14 ("authen-
ticity empties out as a notion as one approaches those mediums which are inher-
ently multiple .. . to ask for the 'authentic' print makes no sense").
' "It is only in the absence of the original that representation may take place.
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ating/stealing of the image may be a critique of the underlying
work as well as the social values that prompted it and gave it
authority.'
These postmodernist attitudes, however, conflict with the
underlying tenets of copyright law.85 Under copyright law, a
work must be an original work of authorship in order to quali-
fy for protection," although such originality may be de mini-
mis.87 Furthermore, the term "original" simply means that the
work has not been copied.88 Yet in Appropriation, the name of
And representation takes place because it is always already there in the world as
representation." Crimp, supra note 69, at 98 (discussing post modernist artists' use
of photographic images to question the concept of originality); see Walter Benjamin,
The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in MODERN ART AND
MODERNISM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY, 218, 220 (Frances Frascina & Charles Harri-
son eds., 1982) (discussing the lost "aura" of art in the age of mechanical repro-
ductions because it is now possible to have several "originals")[hereinafter MODERN
ART AND MODERNISM]; Krauss, supra note 82, at 17 (noting that we are "clinging
to a culture of originals which has no place among the reproductive mediums").
8 See Foster, supra note 73 (discussing the artists' appropriation of emblematic
images from contemporary advertisements and art to comment upon the artists (of
the appropriated image) as well as upon society (the ad)); Hal Foster, Re: Post, in
ART AFTER MODERNISM, supra note 62, at 197 ("[postmodernist art] . . may
'steal' types and images in an "appropriation" that is seen as critical-both of a
culture in which images are commodities and of an aesthetic practice that holds
(nostalgically) to an art of -originality"); Thomas Lawson, Last Exit: Painting, in
ART AFTER MODERNISM, supra note 62, at 161 (noting that "representing someone
else's work as one's own is an attempt to sabotage a system that places value on
the privileged 'production of individual talent"); Patricia Krieg, Note, Copyright,
Free Speech, and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L.J. 1565, 1566 (1984) ("the appropriat-
ed photographs serve to document the norms which the artist is criticizing").
"' Copyright law is based upon the concepts of originality and authorship. See
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 974 (1990) ("originality is
a keystone of copyright law"). However, these are ideas that postmodernists find
outmoded and question. See P. Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 167, 173 (1990) ("Postmodernism questions the integrity, the coherence,
and . . . identity of the humanist individual self.").
86 17 U.S.C. § 102(a): "Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... " For a discussion of
originality, see infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
"' See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d
Cir. 1951) ("All that is needed is that the author contributed something more than
a 'merely trivial' variation, something recognizably his own.").
See Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)
("to be entitled to copyright, the work must be original in the sense that the au-
thor has created it by his own skill, labor and judgment without directly copying
or evasively imitating the work of another") (citation omitted). But see supra note
2 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of originality in an artistic
sense). See also Litman, supra note 85, at 969 (arguing that originality is a legal
fiction).
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the game is to copy,89 thereby undermining traditional cultur-
al and artistic values, which include copyright law and its
modern ideas of authorship, originality and the unique person-
ality that animates discrete works." While the copyright stat-
ute fails to define the term "author"9 for purposes of deter-
mining whether or not photography is protected under copy-
right laws,92 the United States Supreme Court has defined
the term to mean "he to whom anything owes its origin." Thus,
the photographer, by virtue of posing the subjects or choosing
the lighting, has created something original and, therefore, is
an author.9 3
Entrenched in the modernist aesthetic tradition, therefore,
is the idea that one can look at a particular painting of water
lilies and know that it is a "Monet." This artistic concept of
authorship9 -the attribution of a painting to its creator as its
sole source of origin-is challenged by Appropriation.95 An
appropriated image, particularly one that exactly copies the
original work, defies the notion of a masterpiece or a mas-
ter.9" In addition, the techniques employed by postmodern
" See William Zimmer, Appropriation: When Borrowing From Earlier Artists is
Irresistible, N.Y. TIES, June 14, 1992, § 13 (CN), at 22 (discussing Appropriation
and noting that the "whole point is the taking and the commentary on the state
of art and society that can ensue from it"); see also Greenberg, supra note 72, at
14 (the act of Appropriation raises "serious questions about ownership and the
mythic sanctity of the original work"); Marzorati, supra note 69, at 91 ("[Levine]
made it clear that piracy with its overtones of infringement and lack of authoriza-
tion was the point.").
" See Carlin, supra note 59, at 135 ("value of Appropriation is not only that of
bringing copyright issues to the fore, but that of challenging the basic assumptions
upon which they rest").
" See LEAFFER, supra note 56, at 131 ("This key term, author, is left unde-
fined in the [19761 Act."). In fact, the phrase "works of authorship" was purpose-
fully left undefined so as not to "freeze the scope of copyrightable subject matter
at the present stage of communications technology." See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5679.
Burrow-Giles Lithograph Co. v. Savony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884).
" Id. But see Jane M. Gaines, The Portrait of Oscar Wilde, in CONTESTED
CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE LAW 57 (1991) (contending that
"laluthorship in the photograph is a requisite fiction").
" Authorship is "[tihe idea of the individual artist who, as a geniu[s,] creates"
original work. THE BULFINCH POCKET DICTIONARY OF ART TERMS (3d rev. ed.
1992).
" See Carlin, supra note 59, at 108 ("Appropriation is important 'because it
challenges the traditional notions of originality and authorship upon which value
all fine art typically has been judged.'").
" See id. at 129 n.106 ("Appropriation . . . underscores the role of the artist
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artists to create-that is, multiple editions often fabricated by
others-also strain the idea of authorship and originality. 7
In the hands of postmodernists, therefore, the entire con-
cept of what an author is breaks down. All work is derivative
at best.9 The trend has been to remove the author from the
text,99 thereby allowing the reader or viewer to determine
what is intended."0 T1is viewpoint clashes with the goal of
copyright: to reward and protect the author of the text from
whom the work is seen as solely originating.' It is not sur-
as the manipulator or modifier of existing material, rather than of the inventor or
creator of new forms."); Greenberg, supra note 72, at 15 (noting that the emphasis
of simulating the styles of artistic masters "undercuts the celebrated originality
and uniqueness of these masters' processes"); Charles Hagen, The Case of the
Missing Masterpieces, N.Y. TIES, Feb. 14, 1993, § 2 ("It has become fashionable
to attack the idea of the masterpieces, on the ground that it distorts the nature of
artistic creation.").
" See Danoff, supra note 3, at 23 (discussing Koons's work; noting that Koons's
use of artisans to produce his sculptures is a means to avoid "overt personal ex-
pression"); Krieg, supra note 84, at 1579 n.74 (discussing Andy Warhol's Factory
and noting that postmodern art may be "a product of collective process rather
than individual effort.").
"8 See Krieg, supra note 84, at 1579 ("By incorporating mass-produced images
into creative works, the artist asserts that conceptions of individual expression,
creativity, and genius are outmoded in a mass society."); Monroe E. Price & Malla
Pollack, The Author in Copyright: Notes for the Literary Critic, 10 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 703 (1992) ("[fior the modernist, perhaps, all work is collaborative, all
work is derivative"); Wallis, supra note 62, at xviii ("Our society, supersaturated
with information and images not only has no need for individuality, it no longer
owns the concept.").
"' See Gaines, supra note 93, at 63 n.62:
There is no such thing as literary "originality," no such things as the
"first" literary work: all literature is intertextual. A specific piece of writ-
ing thus has no clearly defined boundaries: it spills over constantly into
the works clustered around it, generating a hundred different perspec-
tives which dwindle to a vanishing point. The work cannot be sprung
shut, rendered determinate, by an appeal to the author, for the "death of
the author" is a slogan that modern criticism is now confidently able to
proclaim.
Id. (quoting TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 138 (1983)).
10 Deconstruction of a text is not a purely literary technique. It has also been
applied to art. See generally Louis Marin, Toward a Theory of Reading in the
Visual Arts: Poussin's 'The Arcadian Shepherds,' in THE READER IN THE TEXT:
ESSAYS ON AUDIENCE AND INTERPRETATION (S. Suleiman & I. Crosman eds., 1980);
Amy Adler, Note: Post-Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J.
1359, 1368 (1990) ("Post-Modern art often pressures the viewer to consider the
absence of the artist, and the presence of multiple possibilities of interpretation
which arise when the artist's intent becomes unknowable.") (citation omitted).
"' See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984) ("copyright law strikes a difficult balance between the interests of authors
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prising that the underlying and incompatible notions of Appro-
priation and copyright would lead to litigation." 2 What is
surprising is that there have been few adjudicated cases. Al-
though suits were brought by lesser-known, but still irate,
artists against Andy Warhol and Robert Rauschenberg for
unauthorized appropriation, the cases never went to trial;103
in general, such conflicts are settled out of court.' 4 As a re-
sult, no court has established firm guidelines for determining
how much visual "quotation" was, legally speaking, in fact too
much.0 The first published opinion to examine whether Ap-
propriation constitutes fair use is Rogers v. Koons."0 6
and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings . . . and Society's
competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce"). But see
Feist Publications, Inc. v. F.ural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1290 (1991) ("[tlhe
primary objective of copyright is not to reward . . . the authors, but to promote
progress of science and useful arts.) (citations omitted); George E. Marcus, The
Debate Over Parody in Copyright Law: An Experiment in Cultural Critique, 1 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN., 295, 299-300 (1988) (original purpose of copyright law was to
induce authors and artists to give their gifts to the public).
"' The underlying notions of copyright and Appropriation pit one artist's rights
to her creation squarely against another's right to create.
..3 See Buskirk, supra note 70, at 100-01; Carlin, supra note 59 at 127-28 (dis-
cussing lawsuits brought by artists against artists for unauthorized appropriation);
Gay Morris, When Artists Use Photographs, ARTNEWs, Jan. 1981, at 102.
"" See Jessica L. Darraby, Is Culture a Justiciable Issue?, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 463
(1991) (noting that artists, dealers and museums usually settle their difficulties in
the "back room"); Morris, supra note 103, at 104 (discussing the settlements).
. See Carlin, supra note 59, at 107-08 (lack of clear guidance may lead artists
inadvertently to violate someone else's rights).
"' Although the question of fair use of a photograph in another's work of art is
implied in Heyman v. Salle, 743 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), the court never
reached the question. Instead, it determined that although Salle had copied
Heyman's photograph to create a backdrop for a play, there were disputed issues
of material fact concerning whether or not the backdrop was substantially similar,
which precluded a finding of summary judgment. Id. at 193-94.
The Koons decision has spawned much controversy, not only among artists
but also in legal circles. For other analyses of the case, see generally Greenberg,
supra note 72; E. Kenly Ames, Note, Beyond Rogers v. Koons, A Fair Use Stan-
dard for Appropriation, 93 COLtIM. L. REV. 1473 (1993); Marlin H. Smith, Note,
The Limits of Copyright: Property, Parody, and the Public Domain, 1993 DUKE L.J.
1233.
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III. ROGERS V. KOONS: "TRANSFORMATIVE REINTERPRETATION
OR TOTAL RIP OFF
"07
The art work is, to be sure, a thing that is made, but it says some-
thing other than the mere thing itself is .... The work makes pub-
lic something other than itself; it manifests something other; it is an
allegory. In the work of art something other is brought together with
the thing that is made .... The work is a symbol.08
It was only a postcard photo and I gave it spirituality, animation
and took it to another vocabulary. 10 9
A. The Facts
In 1980, Art Rogers, a professional photographer, was
hired to take photographs of eight German Shepherd puppies.
The black and white photograph,. "Puppies," which eventually
became the basis for a lawsuit, depicted the puppies being held
by their owners, who were seated on a bench. In 1984, Rogers
licensed the photo to Museum Graphics, a company that pro-
duces and sells photo reproductions as note cards and post-
ers.
110
In 1986, Jeff Koons, an artist and sculptor in the
postmodern framework, was preparing for an exhibition at the
Sonnabend Gallery, the theme of which was "Banality."' In
his travels, Koons came across the Museum Graphic reproduc-
tion of "Puppies," and bought the card because it possessed
certain criteria which made it a possible reference for his
" Transformative Reinterpretation or Total Rip-off?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1991,
at B1; see Leval, supra note 42, at 1111 (justification for use of the owned work
turns on whether the use was transformative).
1.8 See Owens, supra note 72, at 212 (quoting Martin Heidegger, The Origin of
the Work of Art, in POETRY, LANGUAGE THOUGHT 19-20 (Albert Hofstauder, trans.,
1971)).
" Ronald Sullivan, Appeals Court Rules Artist Pirated Picture of Puppies, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 3, 1992, at B3 (quoting Jeff Koons).
"' Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
365 (1992).
. For a discussion of PostModern art, see supra notes 60-105 and accompany-
ing text. The gallery was also a named defendant in the case. Discussion of the
court's opinions will be limited to defendant Jeff Koons. The Southern District
decision will be referred to as Rogers; the Second Circuit's decision will be referred
to as Koons.
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sculpture.'12 The photograph depicted a scene that was "typi-
cal, commonplace and familiar."113 In other words, it was ba-
nal. Koons decided to use the note card as a source for his
work and sent the half of the note card containing the photo to
his artisans in Italy with instructions to construct the work "as
per photo.""' The other half, which contained Rogers' copy-
right notice, previously had been discarded." 5 The resulting
larger-than-life sculpture".6 depicted a seated couple holding
eight German Shepherd puppies. The puppies were painted
blue with huge bulbous noses."' The couple was also garishly
painted with daisies arranged in their hair."' After its suc-
cessful showing in the Sonnabend Gallery in New York, the
Banality Show, including the sculpture entitled String of Pup-
pies, traveled to California. It was exhibited at the Los Angeles
Museum of Contemporary Art. In connection with the exhibi-
tion in Los Angeles, Rogers learned of Koons's use of his photo-
graph."1
9
After registering his photograph with the Copyright Of-
fice, '2  Rogers brought an action against Koons and
Sonnabend Gallery alleging copyright infringement and unfair
competition under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 2' and
112 Koons, 960 F.2d at 305.
113 Id.
1'' Koons, 960 F.2d at 305. Koons, however, insisted that the instructions cited
by the plaintiff (and the court) as evidence of misappropriation were six instruc-
tions from 35 pages of letters and faxes to the artisans. Reply Brief for Defen-
dants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees Jeff Koons and Sonnabend Gallery, Inc. at 6 n.10,
Koons, 960 F.2d at 303) (No. 91-7396) [hereinafter Defendants' Reply Briefi.
.1. This became a crucial point for the court. The court and the plaintiff in-
ferred bad faith on Koons's part, which ultimately militated against a finding of
fair use. Id. at 309. See generally infra at notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
"' Although Koons works in limited editions of three, I will refer to the sculp-
tures in the singular.
n1 According to Koons, the choice of the puppies' colors was to take "the sculp-
ture out of the realm of reality," but without eliminating a sense of believability.
Brief and Addendum for Defendants-Appellants Jeff Koons and Sonnabend Gallery,
Inc. at 11, Koons, 960 F.2d at 303 (No. 91-736) [hereinafter Defendants Brief].
... See id. at 37.
"' Art Rogers was notified of the sculpture when the actual owner of the pup-
pies called and wanted to know why Rogers had colorized the photo. Koons, 960
F.2d at 305.
12' Receipt of a copyright registration in the Copyright office for a work is not
necessary under the 1976 Copyright Act until or unless one wants to bring a suit
for infringement. Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
121 42 U.S.C. § 1'142(a) (1989) provides for a finding of liability against one who
1993]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
state unfair competition laws. Rogers then moved for summary
judgment on the issue of copyright infringement. Following
oral argument, the District Court for the Southern District of
New York granted partial summary judgment to Rogers on the
issue of copyright infringement and an appeal followed.'22
B. The Second Circuit Decision
[T]he areas of law devoted to protecting intellectual property con-
front a strange dilemma. On the one hand protection stimulates
individual creative productivity. On the other hand, it can stifle the
advances of a collective effort in a specific arena of human interest
or the "additive" refinements of an individual breaking new ground
on an existing body of work."
While the outcome of the Koons case may be consistent
with current copyright doctrine,'24 the Second Circuit had an
excellent opportunity to enunciate a standard within which
artists working in the same artistic mode as Jeff Koons can
create without fear of reprisals.'25 The court was seemingly
inextricably bound to the status quo application of the fair use
criteria, and resisted any impulse to adopt any new criteria
based upon its exposure to postmodernist concepts.
1. Copyright Infringement
The Second Circuit began its discussion by considering the
issue of copyright infringement.'26 In order to establish copy-
right infringement, a plaintiff must establish both the owner-
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or
her goods, services or commercial activities.
'" Cross appeals were filed. Rogers appealed the district court's failure to set
damages, and Koons appealed, inter alia, the order granting partial summary
judgment.
1" Boggs, supra note 75, at 889..
124 See Greenberg, supra note 72, at 32 (acknowledging that outcome may be
correct based upon current doctrine, but criticizing the opinion for its breadth).
" While it may be appropriate to broaden the fair use doctrine to include the
Appropriation movement, it has been argued that the driving force behind the
movement is its illicit nature. See Elizabeth H. Wang, Note, (Re)Productive Rights:
Copyright and Postmodern Artist, 14 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 261, 281 (1990). To
legitimize Appropriation, therefore, would rob it of its cachet. Id.
"2 If the appellate court found, as did the district court, that there was in-
fringement, then a review of Koons's fair use argument would be necessary.
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ship of a copyright in a work and that the defendant misappro-
priated that which was protected in the work.127 To show
ownership, one must have a work that: (1) is original; 128 (2)
falls within the statutory criteria of a work of authorship; 129
and (3) is fixed in a tangible medium of expression. " ° The
court found that Rogers' photograph met all of these require-
ments.131 In addition, Rogers' Certificate of Registration of
his photograph from the United States Copyright Office was
prima facie evidence of the valid ownership of copyright protec-
tion.3 2 While Koons did not challenge the validity of Rogers'
7 3 NIMMER, supra note 27, § 13.01, at 13-5; Koons, 960 F.2d at 306.
"2 The term "original" is not defined in the copyright statute. See H.R. REP.
NO. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C-.N. 5659,
5664 (the intent of the committee to leave the term undefined was based upon its
desire not to enlarge the standards of copyright protection to require novelty, inge-
nuity or aesthetic merit). The definition of originality has evolved through case
law. Thus, a work is original and copyrightable if it was independently created
and has some de minimis creativity. See generally Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1287 (1991) ("original ... means only that the
work was independently created by the author ... and that it possess at least
some minimal degree of creativity"). For a more detailed discussion of the impor-
tance of originality, see generally Jane Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value:
Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865 (1990) (dis-
cussing problems of copyright law with the concept of originality).
1 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1992). Photographs are protected under this section, falling
within the category of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works. Id. § 102(a)(5); see
Burrow-Giles Lithograph Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (Court determined that
a photograph could be an original work of art). But see Charles Baudelaire, The
Salon of 1859: The Modern Public and Photography, in MODERN ART AND MOD-
ERNISM, supra note 83, at 19-20 ("the photography industry [is] the refuge of every
would-be painter ... [and] if [photography] is allowed to supplement art in some
of its functions, it will soon have . . . corrupted it altogether").
3 A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodi-
ment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author,
is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, repro-
duced or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1992).
131 Koons, 960 F.2d at 307.
13 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) states:
In any judicial proceedings, the certificate of a registration made before
or within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute
prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts
stated in the certificate. The evidentiary weight to be accorded the certifi-
cate of a registration made thereafter shall be within the discretion of
the court.
A defendant, however, may rebut the presumption of validity. See Hasbro Bradley,
Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, Inc., 780 F.2d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 1985) ("certificates of copy-
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copyright registration, the court nonetheless evaluated the
photograph to determine whether or not the portion appropri-
ated by Koons was an original work of authorship protectable
by copyright.133 Relying on the influential case Burrow-Giles
Lithograph Co. v. Sarony,"' which established copyright in
simple photographs, the court established that Rogers' work in-
deed met the criteria of originality. The court further found
that the originality of Rogers' photograph resided, inter alia, in
the posing of subjects, lighting, angle, selection of film and
evoking of expression.'35
Having determined that Rogers owned a valid copyright in
his work, the court turned to the issue of copying."3 6 Accord-
ing to case law, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant has
copied the protected work, and that the copying rises to the
level of an unlawful infringement.'37 These criteria are im-
posed to ensure that a defendant is not held liable for coinci-
dental duplication of the plaintiffs labors. In order to prove
copying, the plaintiff must show that the defendant actually
copied the plaintiffs original. As proof of actual copying is dif-
ficult and rarely available, a plaintiff may make a showing
that the defendant had access to the original work.38' In ad-
dition the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the allegedly
infringing work is substantially similar to the plaintiffs origi-
nal work.'39 While determining substantial similarity is diffi-
right registration are prima facie evidence that the copyrights are valid, shifting to
[the defendant] the burden of proving the contrary").
13 Koons, 960 F.2d at 306.
13 11 U.S. 53 (1884) (first case to determine that a photograph is an appropri-
ate subject for copyright).
"' Koons, 960 F.2d at 307. But see Smith, supra note 106, at 1244-45 (court
did not expound upon the creative elements of Rogers' production of the photo-
graph).
... Even if the defendant's work is identical to the plaintiffs, that fact in and
of itself, is not conclusive that there was an infringement of copyright. The defen-
dant must have copied the copyrighted work. See generally Roth Greeting Cards v.
United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970) (independently created work
that coincidentally duplicates copyrighted material is not infringement); Marx v.
United States, 96 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1938) ("there is no infringement where
two authors produce identical works, provided the second one arrives at his com-
position independently").
13 3 NIMER, supra note 27, § 13.01[B], at 13-8 to 13-9.
1 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) (setting forth the criteria
for establishing copyright infringement).
139 3 NZIMER, supra note 27, § 13.03[A], at 13-27.
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cult to define, the test generally used to determine substantial
similarity is the response of the ordinary observer; that is,
whether she would recognize the allegedly infringing copy as
having been taken from the original work."'
The court found that Koons's admission that he used the
photograph together with his instructions to the artisans to
make the sculpture "as per photo," was direct evidence of copy-
ing and, therefore, was sufficient to support granting summary
judgment to Rogers.' Although Koons conceded using the
photograph, he argued that his use of the photograph was not
sufficient to support a finding of infringement; i.e., copying and
unlawful appropriation, as a matter of law.' Koons contend-
ed that the court below had failed to inquire into the substan-
tial similarity between the two works. According to Koons,
his (re)presentation of the couple holding eight German Shep-
herd puppies was not a literal, verbatim reproduction of the
photo because of the "differences in mood, medium, style, size,
color and impression" of the two works."M
The court rejected Koons's arguments by finding that he
had appropriated the protectable expression captured by
Rogers' photo, and not merely the idea expressed in the origi-
nal work." According to the court, Koons incorporated into
the sculpture the composition, poses and expressions captured
by Rogers." 6  Under the ordinary observer test,"' 7  "no
"' Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960); see infra note 147.
In some cases, courts will find that proof of substantial similarity for purpos-
es of proving copying-in-fact is so strong that it also proves wrongful appropria-
tion. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468-69 (similarities between the plaintiffs and
defendant's works were such as to justify an inference of and to prove misappro-
priation). But see Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity" as Proof of Copying: Toward
Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLuM. L. REV. 1187, 1189-
90 (1990) (courts have erroneously construed the requirement of substantial simi-
larity to infer that there was copying and also that the copyist copied a substan-
tial portion of the plaintiffs work).
.41 Koons, 960 F.2d at 307.
.42 Defendants' Brief at 20.
" Id. at 22-25.
14 Id. at 28.
15 Koons, 960 F.2d at 307 ("It is not the idea of a couple with eight small
puppies seated on a bench that is protected, but Roger's [sic] expression of this
idea . . ").
" Id.
17 The "ordinary observer" test is a method of determining whether or not
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reasonable jury could have differed on the issue of substantial
similarity.""8 Furthermore, the changes in color and texture,
along with additions of flowers and bulbous noses, were insuffi-
cient to raise an issue of material fact. " 9 Based upon its find-
ings that Rogers had valid ownership of a copyright in a work
that Koons had copied, the Second Circuit held that the dis-
trict court had properly granted summary judgment to the
plaintiff.
2. The Fair Use Argument
Koons also argued that despite the court's findings of sub-
stantial similarity and use of the copyrighted photo, the use
was exempt under the doctrine of fair use.50 He argued that
the district court had erred in holding that the sculpture did
not meet the criterion of "comment or criticism" under section
107(1)15' and, therefore, that summary judgment was inap-
propriate.'52 The Second Circuit reviewed Koons's claims of
fair use by applying the statutory four factors 53 to the cir-
cumstances of the case.
a. The First Factor
Koons claimed that the first factor, the nature and the
purpose of the use, should weigh in his favor. He argued that
the sculpture was both a commentary on society and the mes-
there is "substantial similarity" between two works. It asks what the response of
an ordinary, reasonable person would be when exposed to the two works. As posed
by the Second Circuit, the question becomes "whether an average lay observer
would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted
work". Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-lu-Ltd, 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966).
14 Koons, 960 F.2d at 307. However, neither the district court nor the appellate
court saw the actual sculpture. Their .considerations were based upon photographs
of the sculpture and the Rogers photo. See Defendants' Brief at 22, n.6; Martin
Garbus, Law Courts Make Lousy Art Critics, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Apr. 22, 1992, at 46.
149 Koons, 960 F.2d at 307.
15o Id.
'5' Defendants' Brief at 35.
152 According to Koons, summary judgment was inappropriate because there was
an "inadequate and disputed factual record respecting each of the four fair use
factors." Defendants' Brief at 36.
1'3 See supra notes 17-51 and accompanying text.
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sage evoked by Rogers' photograph.' In addition, Koons
claimed that his sculpture should be exempt because of its
social commentary.'55 Koons's fair use argument emphasized
that his work belonged within the postmodernist tradi-
tion-that is, the incorporation of commonplace objects or
themes into artistic work. 5 ' In Koons's view, the sentimen-
tal, kitschy 57 theme of Rogers' photo-post card fit squarely
within the parameters of banality-the concept which defined
Koons' evaluation of Middle America, and which was the idea
that both animated and united the works displayed in the
Sonnabend show.155 Koons's additions of unnatural color,
along with placing flowers in the ears of the woman and out
the middle of the man's head, thereby rendering the sculpture
surreal, was intended as a critique of the work itself and its
underlying social values."'
While acknowledging that the postmodernist practice of
Appropriation existed, the court nonetheless rejected Koons's
arguments. 6 ' Koons's sculpture did not fit within the court's
narrowly drawn definition of parody/satire: "[T]hough the sat-
ire need not be only of the copied work and may ... also be a
parody of modern society, the copied work must be, at least in
part, an object of the parody, otherwise there would be no need
to conjure up the original work. ."."' Although, the court
did not indicate why it came to this conclusion, it did provide a
definition of the term "parody." As employed by the court,
parody "is when one artist, for comedy or social commentary,
closely imitates the style of another" thereby creating a new
art work that makes ridiculous the style and expression of the
original.6 2 Arguably, one could consider blue puppies with
.. See Koons, 960 F.2d at 309.
"' See id.
... Defendants' Brief at 36 ("Jeff Koons is part of a tradition of artists who
incorporate mass produced or commonplace objects in their work ...as the object
of criticism . . ").
"G? The term kitsch comes from the German verb verkitschen: to make cheap.
As an art form, it refers to the artifacts of everyday life, encompassing, for exam-
ple, Elvis Presley paintings on velvet. See ROBERT ATKINS, ARTSPEAK: A GUIDE
TO CONTEMPORARY IDEAS, MOVEMENTS, AND BUZZWORDS 94 (1990).
S Defendants' Reply Brief at 11.
... Defendants' Brief at 37.
" Koons, 960 F.2d at 310.
... Id. (citations omitted).
2 Id. at 309-10.
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clown-shaped noses and garishly painted humans with daisies
sprouting from their heads to be a manner of ridiculing the
benign cheerfulness of the original. Yet the court stated that it
could not "discern any parody of the photograph 'Puppies." 63
A possible explanation for the court's inability to "discern a
parody" is that it had erroneously interchanged the terms "sat-
ire" and "parody."" Although parody is a form of satire, the
target of parodic criticism is primarily another creative work,
while satire primarily criticizes the subject matter of the origi-
nal.165 The imprecise use of terminology, it is argued, allowed
the court to discount Koons's arguments about the sculpture's
purpose. 6 6 The problem faced by the court in defining
Koons'[s] work as "parody", "satire" (or even "piracy") is engen-
dered not so much by its failure to use terminology precisely
(although that compounds the problem) but instead lies in its
approach.
The Second Circuit's approach to parody in Koons is the
traditional (modernist) response that may no longer be appro-
priate in a postmodern age, 67 particularly if the concept of
'6 Id. at 310.
"' See generally id. at 310 (using the terms interchangeably); cf Smith, supra
note 133, at 1248 (distinguishing between the goals of parody and satire). But see
Wendy Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in
the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1601 (1993) (noting
that "[t]here are two types of parody: one where the owned work is a vehicle for a
parody of other aspects of culture or society and where the owned work is itself
the object of the parody").
" See generally Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, 467 F. Supp.
366, 376 (S.D.N.Y.) (where the court defined "parody" as "a work in which the lan-
guage or style of another work is closely imitated" and "satire" as a work which
uses "wit, irony or sarcasm for the purpose of exposing and discrediting vice or
folly"), affd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) .
'" See Smith, supra note 133, at 1249 (noting that the court's linguistic mis-
take prevented it from truly understanding Koons's arguments regarding his use of
the photograph); see also LINDA HUTCHEON, A THEORY OF PARODY 104 (1985)
(commenting that parody must be separated from satire and noting that some of
the most interesting work on parody is made confused and muddled by the "lack
of such a distinction"). Furthermore the Koons court expressed no opinion on how
the parodist could put into effect the recognition requirement. According to the
court, either the recognition stemmed from the fact that the underlying work is
"publicly known," or its existence would be "in some manner acknowledged by the
parodist."
"6 See Marcus, supra note 101, at 296-97 (noting that although American legal
discourse takes a liberal view of parody and copyright, it has failed to go beyond
a very limited vision of the artist and works of art).
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parody itself has degenerated under the constant barrage of a
consumeristic society. One commentator on the postmodern
wrote:
Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique style,
the wearing of a stylistic mask, speech in a dead language: but it is
a neutral practice of such mimicry, without parody's ulterior motive,
without the satirical impulse, without laughter, without that still
latent feeling that there exists something normal compared to what
is being imitated is rather comic. Pastiche is blank parody, parody
that has lost its sense of humor .... 168
Therefore, in order to judge effectively what is parody-turned-
pastiche," 9 the courts must begin to factor into their fair use
calculus the influence of contemporary social factors upon the
"infringing" author's intent.7 ° It is obvious that the Second
Circuit failed to do so.'
7
'
With respect to the commercial purpose of the work, Koons
argued that the district court incorrectly characterized his use
of the photograph as commercial, particularly when the finding
was based solely upon his sales of the sculpture. Generally, the
defendant may rebut the presumptive unfairness attributable
to the unauthorized use upon a showing of a purpose that
qualifies as fair use. 7 According to Koons, the court's conclu-
... See Jameson, supra note 60, at 114. But see Margaret A. Rose, Paro-
dy/Postmodernism, 17 POETIcS 49, 50 (1988) (questioning whether parody in
postmodernism has been reduced to the lower and less reflexive form of imitation
known as pastiche); see also Marcus, supra note 101, at 312 (discussing the criti-
cism of Jameson, but finding that there is power in Jameson's theory of parody-
turned-pastiche because "such basic notions of conventional aesthetics as originali-
ty, authenticity, genius, and the author have been seriously challenged").
Pastiche means "the compilation of motifs from several sources." See Rose,
supra, at 51. It also has come to mean counterfeit in English, and has been used
synonymously with "parody" in French. Id.
.C See Marcus, supra note 101, at 312 ("it is certainly pastiche . . . that is at
stake in the cases that have defined the parody literature in copyright law").
.7 See Weinreb, supra note 54, at 1152-53 (suggesting that the community's
attitudes towards a practice implicating copyright issues may dictate the outcome
of a fair use case).
. Judge Cardamone paid lip service to the idea of Appropriation and accepted
it as a "definition of the objective of some postmodern artists," but he apparently
believed that one's "mode" of artistic expression must be constrained by the tradi-
tional limits of copyright. See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309-10.
172 See generally Fisher, 794 F.2d at 437 (where the court held that "[t]he de-
fendant can rebut the presumption [of unfair use despite the commercial nature of
the use] by convincing the court that the parody does not unfairly diminish the
economic value of the original").
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sion was contrary to the law in the Second Circuit 173 that the
commercial motivation of an author is "irrelevant to a determi-
nation of whether a particular use of copyrighted material in a
work which offers a benefit to the public constitutes a fair
use."174 Rogers contended that Koons's use of the photograph
was unquestionably commercial in nature, citing the profits
earned from the sales of the sculptures and Koons's expressed
goals to acquire money through his art.
1 75
In its review of the profit element of the first factor, the
Second Circuit seemed to be mesmerized by the commercial
character of the Koons sculpture.'76 Although the court stated
that the profit element in the fair use calculus was not control-
ling,7 7 it nevertheless found that Koons's "substantial" profit,
realized from the sales of the statues, weighed in Rogers' fa-
vor. '7 In fact, other commentators, in criticizing the court's
interpretation of commercial use, have noted that the court's
interpretation suggests that "anytime a work is sold, it will not
be protected as fair use."' While this may overstate the ef-
fect of the court's review of the commercial nature of the work,
the court's attitude towards Koons's commercial success is still
troubling.8 ° Its opinion seems to fly in the face of the stric-
ture that the commercial purpose of the work should not tradi-
... Defendants' Brief at 47. Koons cited Consumers Union v. General Signal,
724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984) (commercial
purpose does not necessarily defeat a fair use defense).
174 Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir.
1966) ("both commercial and artistic elements are involved in almost every
[work]").
175 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant at 31, Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d
301 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992) (No. 91-736) [hereinafter
Plaintiffs Briefl.
17 For example, the court began its opinion by noting that the sculptures "bet-
tered the price of the copied work by a thousand to one." 960 F.2d 303. At anoth-
er instance, the court commented that Koons's works "sell at substantial prices."
Id. at 304. In the body of the decision, where the court reviewed the first factor,
it found "that Koons'[s] substantial profit ... militates against the finding of fair
use." 960 F.2d at 309.
177 Koons, 960 F.2d at 309.
178 Id.
17' Greenberg, supra note 72, at 28 (concluding that the court's opinion leaves
"all artists who sell their work vulnerable"); see Olsson, supra note 59, at 1518
(commenting on the Rogers decision and noting: "It seems that the use becomes
commercial merely because Koons is fortunate to make money off of his art.").
1"0 See Greenberg, supra note 72, at 25 (characterizing the language of the
holding as "decidedly hostile to Appropriation strategies").
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tionally be controlling in the fair use calculus."8 '
The next argument that the court advanced to justify its
findings that the sculpture was not a parody was that Koons's
sculpture failed to acknowledge Rogers as its referent for the
copied work. In other words, the sculpture failed to inform the
viewer-audience that there was an underlying original and
separate expression that was attributable to another artist.8 2
The court stressed that there had to be viewer-audience recog-
nition of the original and separate expression underlying the
parody. This recognition factor was important because it "en-
sure[d] that credit [was] given" where due."s In the court's
view, it would not be chilling to Koons's work to require that
the audience be made aware that underlying the parody was a
work by a different artist. Indeed, such a ruling ensured that
the rights of the copyright owner would be acknowledged or
noted.'" Without this limitation, the court contended, one
could make use of another's copyrighted work "solely on the
basis of the ... claim to a higher or different artistic use."
185
This fear seems to be meritless, particularly because a deter-
mination of fair use requires a review of all the factors, even
when the user's work has been judged a parody.8 6
It appears that the court has suggested somewhat
disingenuously that the mere presence of a cite-for example, a
plaque engraved with the words, "Inspired by Art Rogers' pho-
tograph, Tuppies,"' and placed on the "String of Puppies"
... See generally Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,, 366 F.2d 303,
307-08 (2d Cir. 1966) (noting that the commercial motives of the user are irrele-
vant to a fair use determination), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Consumers
Union of Unites States v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir.
1983) (finding that commercial purpose alone is not fatal to a fair use defense).
12 Id.
" Id. A proviso crediting the "original" artist has been used in settlement of
appropriation cases. See Carlin, supra note 59, at 127 (discussing the terms of
settlement arranged between Robert Rauschenberg and Morton Beebe). But see
Marzorati, supra note 69, at 97 (discussing Sherrie Levine's clash with the Weston
estate, despite her credit of his work).
, 960 F.2d at 310.
' Id. The court complained that without a rule requiring the copied work to
be an object of the parody, there is no "practicable boundary to the fair use de-
fense." Id.
"S See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that classifi-
cation of a work as a parody is not presumptively fair use, but that the parody
must be considered "in light of the statutory factors, reason, experience, and ...
the general principles developed in past cases").
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sculpture-might have rendered Koons's work a fair use. Cit-
ing a source, however, does not necessarily free an artist from
the threat of liability for infringement. '87 The court also
failed to consider whether a "cite" would immunize the user
from a claim of infringement where the source is (largely)
unknown to the viewing public. If, as case law is currently
interpreted, the copied work must "conjure up" the original
work in order to be classified as a parody, 8 then it appears
that the value of a "cite" under these circumstances is severely
limited, if not useless. Thus, the court seems to suggest that
only when one uses a well-known image is Appropriation less
likely to be viewed as "exploitation."189
This, however, is where the conflict occurs between
postmodern artists and the law of copyright as presently expos-
tulated by the Second Circuit. The postmodern artist is always
looking for an unexplored domain of contemporary culture
upon which to comment." ° As previously discussed, the chief
aim of Appropriation is to demonstrate that art is always en-
gaged in the imitation of dead styles,191 the only way to ac-
complish that goal is for the postmodern artist to move on to
87 Sherrie Levine can attest to this. See Marzorati, supra note 69, at 97 (dis-
cussing Levine's move to appropriate photographs "free of copyright snags" after
the Edward Weston estate "suggested that the courts might be the proper venue"
to determine her right to appropriate).
'88 See Gordon, supra note 164, at 1604 (noting that "[an entire genre can have
an effect on an artist without any one work or copyright holder being dominant."
If dominance is required, then artists and audiences affected by the genre would
be left without any work in that genre to satirize.).
" In point of fact, this has not proven to be the case, at least not for Jeff
Koons. See United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (1993)
(court found that Koons's use of the "Odie" character was not parody). It is signifi-
cant that in this case, Koons claimed that he did not know that the puppy figure
he used was "Odie" until after the show, and that had he known, he would not
have used it for the piece. Id. The court ruled that since "Odie" was not the tar-
geted object of parody, the teachings of the Koons case required that his parody
argument be rejected.
199 However, the new source for the postmodernist must be something that is
already within the culture. If the artist were to make up the item of critical en-
quiry, then it is not about popular culture, and is not authentic. Interview with
John B. Koegel, Attorney for Jeff Koons (June 8, 1993). See also Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari at 17 n.19, Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[Ilt
would contravene the very essence of the post-modern artistic tradition for an
artist like Koons to make up images intended to represent popular culture, rather
than incorporating real ones.").
191 See discussion of Appropriation supra notes 60-106 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 59: 373
FAIR USE DEFENSE
new areas of existing forms' 2 -areas that are non-obvious in
order to make the point in a new context. So far, the Second
Circuit has turned a deaf ear to the argument. While the court
recognized that requiring the criticized work to be well-known
might chill an artist's expression, 193 it felt that such a limita-
tion was necessary.'
In determining whether Koons's use of the photo was fair
under the first factor, the Second Circuit also examined
Koons's conduct in appropriating the photo. The court found
that Koons's use was intentionally exploitive, and that he had
exhibited bad faith in removing the copyright mark from the
note card. 9 ' Without determining here whether or not
Koons's use was indeed exploitive, the court's determination of
bad faith at this juncture of its analysis is questionable. The
issue was not Koons's conduct, but whether or not his use was
fair. 6 As one experienced commentator has put it, no justi-
fication exists for adding a "morality test" to the scope of fair
use."'97 Arguably, this is just what the Second Circuit has
done.
'" Finding a source that is not protected by intellectual property rights is no
longer an easy proposition. See Greenberg, supra note 72, at 29 (postmodern artist
will have problems finding legitimate source material because the most interesting
images are already protected); see also Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property
and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69
TEX. L. REv. 1853, 1866 (1990) ("in a world where mass media tends to monopo-
lize the dissemination of signifying forms, the cultural resources available to
us . . . are increasingly the properties of others"); Gordon, supra note 164, at 1569
(images that capture artists' attention and become "part of them are often owned
by others").
" The court accepted the possibility that its finding could inhibit Koons's ex-
pression. 960 F.2d at 310.
I4 Id.
... See id.; see also Marincola, supra note 61, at 26 (noting that the risk in ap-
propriating images is that it may be misconstrued as exploitation, "secretly using
what it claims to deny").
1'6 Leval, supra note 42, at 1126 (criticizing the use of bad faith in determining
fair use). But see Weinreb, supra note 54, at 1152 (more general considerations of
fairness, such as how the uses obtained the copy of the original work, may be
important in determining fair use).
"97 Judge Leval also noted that the fair use enquiry should not focus on the
conduct of the second user, but should turn on whether the created work was of
the type to benefit from fair use. Leval, supra note 42, at 1126. But see Wright v.
Warner, 953 F.2d 731, 737 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding the "propriety of the defendant's
conduct is relevant to the 'character' of the use) (quoting Harper & Row Publish-
ers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)).
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Since the court failed to "discern any parody of the photo-
graph 'Puppies,'' 9 and found evidence of bad faith and prof-
it-making intent on the part of Koons, it concluded that Koons
had failed to satisfy the requirements of the first prong of fair
use.' 99 The court believed that allowing a fair use exemption
under these circumstances would eviscerate the doctrine."'
b. The Second Factor
Under the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted
work, the court then examined the nature of Rogers' photo-
graph. It considered Koons's argument that "photography is
more properly characterized as a 'factual' or literal medium,"
thus meriting less protection than a fictional work.2 ' Never-
theless, the court decided that Rogers' photograph, as a work
of art, merited greater protection from copying than, for exam-
ple, would a dictionay. 2 2 It gave short shrift to Koons's ar-
gument that the idea embodied in the photograph-i.e., the
couple seated on a bench holding eight puppies-constituted its
factual basis and, therefore, was entitled to little, if any, pro-
tection.0 3 According to Koons's argument, the couple and the
eight puppies are facts embedded within the culture and,
therefore, are available for use.20 4 While the court seemed to
agree that the idea of a seated couple with puppies was a part
of Americana,0 5 it ignored the commonness of the theme
"8 Koons, 960 F.2d at 309.
199 Id.
200 Id. ("there would be no practicable boundary to the fair use defense").
20' Defendants' Brief at 49.
20 See Koons 960 F.2d at 310.
203 Defendants' Brief at 31; see Olsson, supra note 59, at 1493 n.24 (quoting
Alex J. Sweetman, The Death of the Author: Garry Winogrand, 1928-1984, in 26
THE ARcHIvES 5, 7 (1990) ("IT]he photograph, whatever else it may be, is a literal
fact.")); see also Beryl Jones, Factual Compilations and the Second Circuit, 52
BROOK. L. REV. 679, 695 (1986) (noting that "the photograph often reflects facts in
the most accurate form possible").
204 Defendants' Brief at 31. See generally Wang, supra note 125, at 273-74 (not-
ing that ideas, when applied to visual arts, serve as the equivalent of the subject
matter or theme of the piece; therefore the use of thematic material is not
protectable by copyright since it encompasses an idea in the public realm); Kreig,
supra note 84, at 1570 (history of Western art is full of recurring themes which
an artist may appropriate).
20 Judge Cardamone characterized the photograph as "a typical American
scene-a smiling husband and wife holding a litter of charming puppies." Koons,
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when it decided the appeal.
Moreover, Koons contended that there was no other way to
portray the common idea of a seated couple holding puppies.
Therefore, the use of that idea was not an infringement of
Rogers' copyright."6 It is settled copyright law that where
there may be limitations in the number of ways one might
express an idea, the expression of that idea does not constitute
infringement of another's copyright in a similarly portrayed
idea."' For example, in Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v.
Kalpakian, the Ninth Circuit found that the expression of a
jeweled "bee pin" was inextricably bound to the idea of a jew-
eled bee pin."' As it could not be demonstrated that the idea
of such a pin was separable from its rendition, the expression
of the idea was not protectable."9 Thus, where the "merger"
of idea and expression occurs, copyright protection is denied to
the merged expression because ideas are not protectable by
copyright. 10 Similarly, settings that are indispensable to the
portrayal of a given topic are not protectable under copyright
law.21' In short, Koons's argument encompassed the merger
doctrine; that is, that the literal, factual elements and scene
depicted in Rogers' photograph were not protectable because
there were limits to the ways in which the underlying theme
and its presentation could be portrayed. The court also seem-
960 F.2d at 303.
" See Defendants' Brief at 32-33. Rogers objected to this characterization by
responding that there existed at least fifty ways of depicting the couple and the
puppies. See Plaintiffs Brief at 23 n.18. However, this argument ignores the fact
that the idea is so mundane that any expression of it would likely duplicate an-
other artist's prior expression of the same idea.
" See generally Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880). This case is considered to
have propounded the idea-expression dichotomy in the United States. For a full
discussion of the idea-expression dichotomy, see Edward Sammuels, The Idea-Ex-
pression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REV. 321 (1989).
208 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971) (expression and idea merge).
21 "There is no greater similarity between the pins of plaintiff and defendants
than is inevitable from the use of jewel-encrusted bee forms in both." Id. at 742.
2"' The "merger" argument has rarely worked. For one example where the argu-
ment prevailed, see generally id. at 738.
211 This concept is called sc&nes d faire and also applies to incidents and charac-
ters. See generally Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236
(3d Cir. 1986) (court denied copyright protection to certain elements of computer
program because the result program sought to achieve could be accomplished only
in very limited number of ways), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Reyher v.
Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.) (finding no infringement of
copyright in use of children's book), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
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ingly ignored Koons's proposition that these factual elements of
the photograph were so mundane that if protected, any possi-
ble new expression of the scene would likely infringe on the
prior expression. Thus, it appears that the Second Circuit
protected both the idea and the expression when it precluded
Koons from adopting the theme or idea underlying Rogers'
work.
In addition, Koons contended that the issue of the
photograph's publication was a significant consideration. Ac-
cording to Koons, Rogers' photo had been widely distributed,
thus deserving less protection than an unpublished work.2"2
The court, however, failed to give any weight to Koons's argu-
ment2 13 This is particularly surprising because the Second
Circuit has ruled in several cases that a work could receive
greater protection where the author had not already had suffi-
cient opportunity to profit from her artistic expression.214 It is
reasonable to expect that the converse would be true: where
the work has been published, and the author has had an ex-
tensive opportunity to profit from its licensing and circulation,
the court would be inclined to find that another artist's use of
it was "fair."215 Nevertheless, the court found that Rogers'
"hope to gain a financial return for his efforts with the photo-
graph"216 tilted its finding in favor of Rogers.
c. The Third Factor
The court noted that the same analysis applied to the
determination of the amount and substantiality of work used, \
as that used to determine if the copied work was substantially
22 Defendant's Brief at 32-33
213 At the time that the suit was initially brought, the operative presumption
was that the unpublished nature of the work militated against fair use. See gener-
ally Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. National Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 564
(1985) ("the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished works").
214 See generally Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987) ("[unpublished] works normally enjoy complete protec-
tion against copying any protected expression").
25 See New Era Publications v. Carol Pub. Group, 904 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir.)
("no persuasive reason given why a court should be less, rather than more likely
to find fair use when . . . the copyrighted material has been published"), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 297 (1990).
216 See Koons, 960 F.2d at 310.
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similar and infringing.217 Koons argued that he had made
significant changes in the expressive elements of the photo-
graph due to the textural differences-the colors and the
mood-evoked by the sculptural form." 8 Koons claimed to
have appropriated only the "factual" visual information con-
tained in the photograph; that is, he took the "two people with
eight puppies, a bench and a background."" 9
The court, however, had little difficulty in finding that the
balance tilted in Rogers' favor. Despite Koons's arguments to
the contrary,"O the court found that Koons had
impermissibly copied the very essence of Rogers' photograph
and had incorporated "the very expression of the work."
221
The court found that, in appropriating nearly the totality of
the photograph, Koons's quantitative use exceeded the level
permitted under the fair use doctrine. Since Koons' work did
not reach the level of parody, it would not be afforded the lee-
way reserved for parodies. 2
Koons, however, contended that the underlying idea of
Rogers' photograph, which he admittedly used, was not pro-
tected by copyright. In fact, in copyright cases involving photo-
graphs, courts have held that the plaintiff-photographer cannot
monopolize the various poses he used to create a photograph
because the protection only extends to the "photographic ex-
pression of these poses and not the underlying ideas there-
for."21 It is submitted that the Second Circuit, in analyzing
Koons's substantial use of Rogers' photograph, failed to make
that very significant distinction.
It is widely acknowledged that differentiating the non-
protectable idea from the expression eligible for protection is
mystifying, calling for distinctions between the two that border
on the metaphysical.224 Part of the problem in Koons may lie
217 Id. at 311.
218 Defendants' Brief at 52 ("String of Puppies,' because it is a three-dimension-
al sculptured work, has none of the 'photographic' qualities of the note card.").
2," Defendants' Brief at 53.
' See id. at 30-33
2" Koons, 960 F,2d at 311.
222 Id.
' Id. (emphasis added). In Koons, it appears the court found that Koons's
instructions to the artisans to "make the sculpture like the photo' was evidence of
his incorporation of the "essence" of Rogers' work.
224 See generally Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487,
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in the court's dual application of the "substantiality" factor in
its analysis of both fair use and infringement." Commen-
tators have suggested that the overlapping use of the substan-
tiality factor may be unsound because, by virtue of making the
user vulnerable to liability for copyright infringement, it simul-
taneously denies his ability to make a tenable fair use de-
fense."' In other words, if the substantiality requirement for
infringement also satisfies the same test in the fair use deter-
mination, "every fair use defense would fail as a matter of
law."227 Furthermore, when determining infringement, the
"substantiality" criterion fails to discriminate adequately be-
tween the permissible use of the "idea" and the impermissible
use of the "expression."2"
When the idea-expression dichotomy is applied to visual
arts, its implementation becomes even more difficult because
the "conceptual distinctions between idea and expression be-
come almost impossible."229 These distinctions are particular-
ly hard to make when, for example, a photograph is at issue
because the individual visual elements comprising the photo-
graph seem to be inseparable.' It appears that the Koons
court experienced this difficulty. Although the court found that
the essence of Rogers' photo had been copied "nearly in toto,"
the court did not define the elements of the "essence" that it
deemed crucial to these findings." 1 Thus, it is not clear that
489 (2d Cir. 1960) ("isolating the idea from the expression and determining the
extent copying required for unlawful appropriation" [is] "troubling").
See Koons, 960 F.2d at 311.
z" See Abramson, supra note 31, at 157.
227 Id.
22 See Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness
of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719, 739 (suggesting that the
ordinary observer test is likely to include the underlying (unprotectable) idea in
determining if two works are substantially similar); Latman, supra note 140, at
1198 (the phrase "substantially similar" does not distinguish between "protected
and unprotected elements").
See generally Robert Yale Libott, Round the Prickly Pear: The Idea-Expres-
sion Fallacy in a Mass Communications World, 14 UCLA L. REV. 735, 751 (dis-
cussing the problems of applying the idea-expression to visual art infringement
cases); Wang, supra note 125, at 274 ("with abstract art, however, the dichotomy
between idea and expression becomes inoperative").
2"0 See John Gastineau, Note, Bent Fish: Issues of Ownership and Infringement
in Digitally Processed Images, 67 IND. L.J. 95, 118 (1991) (issue of substantial
similarity poses problems when applied to photography because of the tendency to
perceive the visual elements in photographs as "fully integrated and inseparable").
21 In an earlier part of the opinion, the court stressed that the trial court's
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the court successfully managed to separate the underlying idea
of the photograph from its expression232 and, thereby, may
have unwittingly protected the totality of the photograph-its
idea and its expression.2
Moreover, the court failed to take into consideration that
copyright law was initially created for the protection of literary
rather than visual works." 4 While it may be true that "it is
not fair use when more of the original is copied than neces-
sary,""' the court has yet to distinguish the differences in the
quantitative character of "necessity," which is characteristic of
quoting a literary source and copying a visual one.236 The
court did not understand that visual information is not of the
same nature as information that can be imparted verbally.237
Rather, a visual work has a "complex, multi-layered character"
that is not so easily discernable upon a first, second or even
third glanceY The meaning of an artistic work, particularly
findings that the poses, the shading and the expressions (of the couple), which
were the embodiment of the Rogers' original contribution, were copied by Koons.
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365
(1992). The court, however, was discussing the infringement standard and not the
fair use standard.
' See Kisch v. Ammirati & Purs Inc., 657 F. Supp. 380, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(noting the difficulties involved in the application of substantial similarity).
2 See Wang, supra note 125, at 273 (suggesting that the "substantial
similarity' requirement effectively affords copyright protection to some ideas").
" See Timberg, supra note 58, at 317 (concluding that the "qualitative substan-
tiality" principle is an example of an irrational carryover from the law of literary
copyright to visual arts").
'2 See Koons, 960 F.2d at 311 (quoting Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811
F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
" For example, there is a cartoon in which two mice are commenting on the
decision in Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979). In its opinion, the court said that Air
Pirates took too much of the original cartoon when effecting their parody. The gist
of the conversation between the mice is that they are trying to decide how much
Appropriation is too much from the viewpoint of the court, Disney and Air Pirates.
Trying to explain the cartoon makes it even more clear that a written description
is not a satisfying substitute for the visual experience. See Bernard Timberg, New
Forms of Media and the Challenge to Copyright Law, in FAIR USE AND FREE IN-
QUIRY, supra note 52, at 213 ("The best way to deaden a film's statement is to
reduce it to words.").
'7 Remember the old adage that "a picture is worth a thousand words."
See Bernard Timberg, supra note 236, at 213 ("[vlisual information possesses
a complex, multilayered character unlike that of the written word") (quoting Rich-
ard Sorensen, To Further Phenomenological Inquiry: The National Anthropological
Film Center, 16 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 267, 268 (1975)).
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one situated in the postmodernist vein, is even less fathom-
able, because within such a world view, images are understood
to have multiple and indeterminate meanings. This does not
accord with the copyright world view in which an image is
viewed as the expression of a singular idea. 9
Furthermore, a photograph is designed to be consumed in
its entirety.4 ° Unlike a book from which pertinent sections
may be culled to illustrate a point, the complete photograph
must be seen in order for the viewer to experience its im-
port.24 Making a "comment or criticism" of a visual work re-
quires access to the entire work.242 Although access to the
complete work is different than use of the entire work, mere
access to the work for an artist working in the postmodernist
view point may not be sufficient. To criticize the work, the
postmodern artist may need to use the entire image in order to
engage effectively in a critique of it or the cultural values it
espouses.243 Thus, to limit an artist's (Koons's) use of
another's art to some undefined quotient, limits his ability to
analyze, criticize and comment upon the work as well as con-
stricts his ability to engage in a new form of creativity, al-
though that creativity may not have been foreseen by Congress
when it designed copyright laws to foster progress in the
arts.2'
" Foster, supra note 84, at 196 ("As a textual practice, postmodern art cannot
be translated."); see Wang, supra note 125, at 276 ("the idea in [Aippropriation
(art) that images have indeterminate meanings does not make sense in the copy-
right world where an image is viewed as the expression of one idea") (citations
omitted).
240 See Bernard Timberg, supra note 236, at 216 (fair use defense is unavailable
when a photograph is used in its entirety; it is "designed to be consumed in this
manner"); Patry, supra note 12, at 434 (discussing use of the entirety of cartoons;
noting that due to the nature of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, it is very
difficult to use in "any manner other than their entirety").
141 See Timberg, supra note 236, at 213 (noting that each picture is an aesthet-
ic whole, "incapable of any excerpting or fragmentation").
242 Id.
24 See Owens, supra note 72, at 235 (noting that it is necessary to participate
in the very activity denounced in order to denounce it); Carlin, supra note 59, at
125 n.96 ("primary purpose of Appropriation is to copy its source while simulta-
neously undermining or changing the ideas with which that source is typically
identified").
244 See Bernard Timberg, supra note 236, at 217 (noting that if the photograph
is necessary for critical analysis, it must be used in its entirety and cannot be
"analyzed adequately in part or in a verbal translation of [its] content"); see also
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d. The Fourth Factor
As to the fourth factor which assesses the likely effect of
the unauthorized use upon the potential market for the copy-
righted work, the court also found against Koons. Koons ar-
gued that his limited edition of three sculptures did not satisfy
the demand for the original photograph245 because the sculp-
ture satirizes the mood and sentiment that Rogers meant to
convey in the photograph.246 Due to the differences in affect
(and effect), Koons claimed that the sculpture "String of Pup-
pies" would appeal to an entirely different audience.24 Thus,
according to Koons, where the intended audience for the two
art works-the photograph and the sculpture-were different,
it was unlikely that Rogers would be harmed.24 The court
dismissed these arguments, noting that the critical inquiry was
whether or not Koons had intended to profit from the produc-
tion of the sculpture. 49 The court determined that Koons,
had so profited.5 Since Koons's work was primarily commer-
cial in nature, this copying was deemed inevitably to undercut
the demand for the original work.'
Rogers, contended that Koons's unauthorized use of the
photo deprived him of the right to earn income through the
sale of "art rendering rights" in his photograph.2 According
Abramson, supra note 31, at 167 (suggesting that greater latitude be given to
those who use photographs when determining substantial use); Sigmund Timberg,
supra note 58, at 317 (finding that such limitations "cripple the creative efforts" of
those wishing to use parody or satire for comment or criticism).
24 Defendants' Brief at 42.
24. Rogers claimed that the message his photograph evoked was one of 'joy and
pride." On the other hand, Koons intended to disturb the viewer with a nightmar-
ish portrayal of a couple seated with puppies. He succeeded. See Defendants' Brief
at 30 (art critic discussing the sculpture comments that "impression created by
sculpture was 'horrific"); Arthur C. Danto, The Whitney Biennial, in ENCOUNTERS
& REFLECTIONS, supra note 66, at 281 ("There was a figure of a man smiling with
benignity at an armful of puppies that haunts one like a bad dream . .. ").
247 Defendants' Reply Brief at 22 (commenting that "Koons produced a distinct
work of art that mocks the cultural milieu of Rogers'[s] photo. Consequently, there
are entirely separate devotees for these disparate expressions . . . ").
2' Id. at 23. Koons cited for this proposition the district court's holding in
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991). However,
that judgment was eventually reversed. 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. grant-
ed, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
245 Koons, 960 F.2d at 312.
251 Id. at 310.
251 Id.
252 Plaintiff's Brief at 36. "Art rendering" is an "[a]rt version or copy of a photo-
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to Rogers, if all artists were allowed to appropriate, the market
for art rendering would be destroyed.253 In addition, Koons's
use would adversely impact upon Rogers' ability to create or
authorize art works derived from the "Puppies" photo-
graph.2
5 4
According to Koons, however, there was no demonstrable
evidence of "any reasonable likelihood (past, present or future)
of economic injury" to Rogers resulting from the appropriation
of the photograph.2 5 Thus, Rogers' argument was based upon
a claim that, in Koons's view, was groundless.256 The court
agreed with Rogers, noting that the market for "authorized"
sculptures like the "Puppies" photograph was reduced because
of Koons's sculpture. 2 7 The court also noted that the mere
change of one medium (photography) to another (sculpture) did
not reduce the harm to the copyright owner.25 ' The pertinent
question was whether or not there was a "meaningful likeli-
hood of future harm,"259 which did not depend upon demon-
strable proof of actual harm. The court concluded that Koons's
use of Rogers' note card was "piracy" and affirmed the district
court's findings.26° The court did not examine whether or not
the sculpture competed in the same market with Rogers' photo-
graphic note card. Instead, the court focused on whether Koons
had planned to profit from his use of the Rogers' photograph.
The court reasoned that because Koons had realized a profit
(and had intended to realize a profit), there was some mean-
ingful likelihood of future harm.26'
graph or a portion of one by an artistlillustrator in which the photograph is recog-
nizable in the final art work." Id. at 37.
253 Id.
25 Id. at 40.
255 Defendants' Reply Brief at 17 (arguing that the deficiency in Rogers' suit
was the absence of evidence of economic injury).
26 Koons argued that Rogers' assertion that destruction of the art rendering
market would occur if appropriation was encouraged was a theoretical exercise.
Defendants' Reply Brief at 19.
" This, of course, assumes that there is another artist who wanted to use
Rogers' photo, and pay for such use. See 960 F.2d at 312.
m Id.
259 Id.
2" Id. at 303. The court also reviewed Rogers' claim for infringing profits and
remanded the case to the district court for a determination of the amount. It also
reviewed the turnover order and found it appropriate. Id,
211 See id. at 312 ("where the use is intended for commercial gain some mean-
ingful likelihood of future harm is presumed") (citation omitted).
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Yet the court's implicit assumption-that artists create
without any thought of monetary compensation-is a romantic
notion left from the modern era.262 This is not to say that the
creative process is no longer an ineluctable one for artists; it is
still necessary for them to create.26 The court's ruling, how-
ever, seems to imply that to care about making money is some-
how crass and less than artistic.2"' The fairness of the use
should not be determined solely by whether or not the appro-
priated work has been tainted by the profit realized by the
appropriating author.265 Rather, the court's determination
should have focused on whether or not Koons's work substan-
tially impaired the market for Rogers' photo, not whether there
was a market for Koons' own work. This is an important con-
sideration, particularly when the pervasive rationale under-
lying the grant of copyright is that it provides authors with an
economic incentive to create.266
One of the problems in analyzing the fourth factor is de-
ciding the parameters of the relevant market.267 On the one
26 See Olsson, supra note 59, at 1500 ("the romantic notion of an artist creat-
ing merely to create rather than to generate profits is a deeply held belief). But
see Lacey supra note 7, at 1574 (while there are many reasons why artists create,
monetary gain is not the primary reason). See generally Peter Jaszi, On the Au-
thor Effect: Contemporary Copyright & Collective Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 293 (1992) (discussing the problems of romanticizing authorship).
23 See Boggs, supra note 75, at 889 (author noting that as an artist, he be-
comes captivated by images which are impossible to escape); Lacey, supra note 7,
at 1574 (commenting that artists need to write or paint because creating is an
integral part of their personality).
264 Koons, 960 F.2d at 312 (finding that there is "nothing in the record to sup-
port the view that Koons produced [the sculpture] for anything other than sale as
high-priced art"); see also Jaszi, supra note 262, at 308 (noting that Koons's
"worldliness in money matters does not weigh in his favor").
2" See Robert J. Kapelke, Comment, Piracy or Parody: Never the Twain, 38
CoLO. L. REv. 550, 568 (1966) (noting that using commercial intent as indicator of
unfair use was unrealistic).
2" See generally Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (Court states that the
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that the encouragement of individual effort for person-
al gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors
and inventors in "Science and useful Arts"). But see Marcus, supra note 101, at
300 (discussing theory that the purpose of copyright is an inducement to get art-
ists to give their work to society as a gift").
26 See William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit,
Presumptions and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 687 (1993) (observ-
ing that analysis of the fourth factor "raises difficult issues of theory and proof,"
such as the definition of the market, the types of harm to the work that should
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hand, the market definition must be broad enough to cover the
uses enumerated in the Copyright Act.2"' On the other hand,
the market must be narrowed so that it does not catch every
possible use and render the fair use provisions inoperative." 9
In Koons, the court defined the relevant potential market to
include Rogers' prerogative to sell the rights in his photograph
to another artist who then could produce a sculpture based on
the photograph. 7 ' Koons's sculpture, the court found, im-
paired the market for Rogers' photograph because its existence
either precluded or substantially reduced the possibility that
Rogers would be able to sell those rights. 1
The court based its findings of market impairment upon
an inappropriate analogy.272 The court analogized the Koons
case to one involving an unauthorized movie adaptation of a
book, which would be unfair use because of its effect upon the
author's potential to sell the adaptation rights.273 The court
was correct to assume that a book and its movie adaptation
were competitive in the same or similar market. However,
analogizing between the Koons sculpture and the Rogers pho-
tograph was inapt on two grounds. First, the expressive intent
of the two works were not identical and, second, the photo-
be considered, and the allocation of the burdens of proof and production).
2" Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(5) (1988) provides a copyright owner with the exclu-
sive right to do or authorize the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lend-
ing;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to dis-
play the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(5) (1988).
26 See Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 267, at 688 (where authors remark that
too broad an interpretation of the market would always lead to a determination
against fair use).
271 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 312 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 365 (1992).
271 Id.
272 See id.
273 Id.
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graph and sculpture were not competing in the same market.
A better argument would have been one which the court had
mentioned only cursorily-the effect that photographs or note
cards depicting the Koons's sculpture would have on the mar-
ket for Rogers' photograph and note cards. 4
Arguably a movie adaptation would depict the book's con-
tent and expression with relative accuracy. Koons, however,
objected to the contention that his sculpture emitted the same
tone or feeling as the Rogers photograph. In the photograph,
warm and fuzzy (if not furry) feelings are extolled, while in the
sculpture these sentiments are ridiculed as the continued ef-
fects of standardized "Hailmark" imagery.275 The emotions
emitted in the former are not generated in the latter. By the
same token, acquisition of a sculpture will not satisfy someone
who wishes to mail a note to a friend or to frame a photograph.
Accordingly, it is unlikely that the same persons who would
buy the photograph would buy the sculpture as a substitute for
the photograph or note card, even if the prices were not "bet-
tered by a thousand to one."
276
Furthermore, the court failed to consider either the sophis-
tication of the buyer or the nature of the market in its analysis
of the Koons sculpture's market effect. While an inquiry of this
type is typically found within the ambit of trademark law,277
it is not inapposite here,278 particularly when a Museum
Graphics card can be purchased in any airport or card shop for
relatively little money. In contrast, buying a sculpture involves
274 Id.
21 See supra note 249 and accompanying text for comments of Rogers and
Koons regarding their intent in expressing the scene of the couple and their pup-
pies.
"' See Koons, 960 F.2d 303.
2 7 See generally Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg Specialists, Inc., 931
F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1991) ("when services are expensive or unusual, the buyer can
be expected to exercise greater care in her purchases"); Plus Products v. Plus
Discount Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1983) (buyer sophistication is an im-
portant consideration to weigh in evaluating likelihood of confusion); Girl Scouts of
The United States of Am. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 808
F. Supp. 1112, 1129 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (the value of an article may influence the
sophistication and awareness of buyers which in turn may influence the degree of
confusion as to origin).
276 See generally Michelle Brownlee, Note, Safeguarding Style: What Protection is
Afforded Visual Artists By the Copyright and Trademark Laws?, 93 COLO. L. REV.
1157, 1173 (discussing application of trademark law principles, such as consumer
confusion in visual art cases).
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a major investment of capital. 9 A better approach would
have been an analysis of the market effect that considered not
the profit Koons realized, but the sophistication of the buyer(s),
the differences in the market and the effect of possible note
card production by Koons. This would have produced a more
evenhanded and balanced accounting of the fourth factor.
C. Problems with the Second Circuit's Decision
Precedent is only a good thing if it is still able to accommodate the
reality of the changing paradigm."o
Time works changes, brings into being new conditions and purposes.
Therefore a principle to be vital must be of wider application than
the mischief which gave it birth. 8'
When Art Rogers won his case against Koons, he felt a
mixture of relief and vindication.2 The court, after all, had
agreed with him that "photographers [had] a right to protect
their material.""' Yet the irony of the Koons decision is that
Rogers, or others like him, could find himself "hoist by his own
petard."2" The Koons decision seemingly precludes a photog-
rapher from taking an unauthorized photograph of a statue
and commercially benefitting from this work. For example,
when Koons's New Work: A New Generation exhibit, which
included the String of Puppies sculpture, toured the San Fran-
cisco area, photographers sympathetic to Rogers' claims filled
the museum and took pictures of Koons's work.8 ' One of the
photographers refused to sign the museum release, which
stated that the pictures would be used for educational purpos-
279 See Greenberg, supra note 72, at 32 (noting that it was "farfetched" to imag-
ine that Koons's high-priced art could affect the market for works sold in gift
shops); Brownlee, supra note 277, at 1174 ("fine art is rarely bought and sold
under circumstances in which consumer confusion is likely to play a role since
buyers are generally aware of what they are buying").0 Boggs, supra note 75.
281 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
28 See Jesse Hamlin, Something Else, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 14, 1992, at E2 (where
Rogers, commenting on the Second Circuit decision, said, "I feel vindicated").
28 Liz Lufkin, Puppy Plagiarism in the Art World, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 18, 1990,
at B3 (quoting Art Rogers).
214 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 4 ("For 'tis the sport to have
the engineer Hoist with his own petard.").
28 See Liz Lufkin, New Protest Over Puppies, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 4, 1990, at El.
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es only and would not be sold."8 6 Had he developed these pho-
tographs and sold them to the media, for example, he might
suddenly find himself on the opposite side, claiming that his
photograph was a "fair use" of and commentary upon the
sculpture. Based on the Koons decision, the court would not
find such a use "fair" because the "taking" of Koons's work in
its entirety by the photographer was an infringement of
Koons's copyrighted sculptures and a deprivation of Koons's
potential to profit from photographs derivative of his work."7
Such a photographer would presumably wish to make the
argument that his use was a fair one-his objective in taking
and displaying the photograph was to make a commentary
upon or criticism of Koons's art of Appropriation.2" Even if
the photographer's claims that the photo criticizes Koons's art
were accepted by the court, the commercial benefits realized by
the photographer's own "appropriation" would likely weigh
against a finding of fair use.289 Furthermore, the court would
likely find that the use was qualitatively and quantitatively
substantial because the photograph incorporated the totality of
the sculpture; a photograph of the sculpture, whatever its
intrinsic artistic elements, would contain the "essence" of the
artistic expression and ideas of the sculpture.290 Finally,
when considering the impact of the photograph on the market
for Koons's works, the court could decide that the photo dimin-
ished Koons's abilities to utilize his full range of market rights
effectively, particularly if the photo was used as the basis of a
note card that disseminated Koons's work to the public in a
fashion contrary to Koons's desires.
28 Id.
' In fact, the district court in Rogers acknowledged as much when it noted
that an unauthorized photograph of a copyrighted statue was an infringement. See
Rogers v Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
2 8 See Lufldn, supra note 284, at El. The underlying rationale behind the
"shootout" at the San Francisco Museum of Modem Art was to criticize Koons's
appropriation of Rogers' photograph.
28 This would be particularly true given the wording of the Museum's release.
29 See Bracken v. Rosenthal, 151 F. 136, 137 (N.D. Ill. 1907) (determining the
issue of copyright infringement of a sculpture by a photograph, court remarked
that "[tihe question is not whether the photograph contains artistic elements of its
own but whether it also contains any of the artistic ideas and conceptions ex-
pressed in the statuary").
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CONCLUSION
Although the parameters of fair use have been adequate in
circumscribing the boundaries of use in a literary sense,
291
the doctrine is too narrowly drawn with respect to the visual
arts. To return to our hypothetical artist, "Wilma,"292 busily
making a collage of Koons's works, to comment upon the status
of art and the artist in society, we find an artist in jeopardy.
Her use of the photographs of his work in her own, even
though they are grouped differently, will not be considered fair
even if the Koons precedent is strictly applied. 93 The same
problem exists for a photographer who takes a picture of a
copyrighted statue" or of a photograph. 5  In either in-
stance the photographer has appropriated the entirety of the
object. Even if the work is seen as a valid comment or criticism
on Koons's work and the world view that motivates it, the
court in all probability would find that her use was more sub-
stantial than required to make the comment or criticism in-
tended.296 In works of this nature, however, entire images are
generally used and necessary in order to engage effectively in
the intended commentary.2 97 The substantiality of use crite-
rion effectively operates to curtail an entire genre of artistic
criticism and commentary. Thus, it does not work well when it
291 See Krieg, supra note 84, at 1565 (noting that the doctrine of fair use 'fails
to provide meaningful standards governing the use of visual, rather than written,
material").
292 See supra INTRODUCTION for a description of Wilma's work.
2 See Krieg, supra note 84, at 1573 (commenting that appropriated images
used in montage are "necessarily identical" to those images in the copied work,
and are thus unlikely to be protected under the fair use doctrine.)
29 See Bracken, 151 F. at 137 (finding that "to hold that a piece of statuary
may be infringed by a picture of the statuary seems in every way in accord with
the reason and spirit of the law").
2 See Olsson, supra note 59, at 1519-20 (analyzing a hypothetical claim of
copyright infringement brought by Walker Evans against Sherrie Levine).
2 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1991) ('even where there is
criticism, there are limitations on what constitutes fair use"), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 365 (1992). But see Susan Lineham Faaland, Comment, Parody and Fair Use:
The Critical Question, 57 WASH. L. REV. 163, 187 (1981) (contending that verbatim
copying can result in valid criticism).
29 See Olsson, supra note 59, at 1519 (in determining if appropriated work
qualifies for fair use, author remarks that such an analysis is problematic in that
an artist may need to quote the "essence" of a photograph in order to refer to it
properly).
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determines that an appropriation of a protected work of art is
not "fair."29 8
In Koons, the Second Circuit could have fashioned a new
line of inquiry that acknowledges the problems for visual art-
ists working within the postmodernist genre. Rather than base
a decision regarding substantiality of use solely upon the
"iqualitative" aspects of the appropriation, it might have also
asked whether the use, in relation to the copyrighted work,
transformed the finished product into something creative and
original.299 In this way, the user's creative instincts are al-
lowed free rein without their form of criticism and commentary
being unnecessarily "chilled." Instead, however, the Second
Circuit imposed new burdens upon visual artists. Thus, the
artist must not only be attentive to how much is being quoted,
but she must also pay attention to what is quoted."' The re-
quirements set forth by the court unnecessarily infringe upon
Wilma's-or any artist's-freedoms to choose her subjects and
her mode of expression.
The Second Circuit in Koons missed an excellent opportu-
nity to make the fair use doctrine more conducive to contempo-
rary realities, and more responsive to the problems resulting
from an increasingly technological and visual age.' Rather
than take the bold initiative and expand fair use, the court
settled for the conservative path of least resistance and, there-
fore, will continue to struggle with the inadequacies of the fair
use doctrine well into the twenty-first century.0 2
"' See Timberg, supra note 58, at 313 (deciding that the "substantiality of use"
criterion of fair use appears unsuited for visual arts).
, See generally Abramson, supra note 31, at 158 (arguing that a creative prod-
uct that employs "verbatim" a copyrighted work should not automatically be pre-
cluded from a finding of fair use, if the use was part of an original work).
" See Koons, 960 F.2d at 311 (finding that Koons went beyond the factual
subject matter of the photograph).
' See Daniel Grant, Computer Copycats Blur Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., Oct.
3, 1991, at 12 (artist whose work had been appropriated complained that "techno-
logical changes have been so rapid that the law strains to deal with them"); Rick
G. Morris, Use of Copyrighted Images in Academic Scholarship and Creative Work:
The Problems of New Technologies and a Proposed "Scholarly License," 33 IDEA,
J.L. & TECH. 123, 151 (1993) (noting that the inflexibility of present copyright
laws in the face of a rapidly changing technology leads to the chilling of speech,
scholarship and art).
"&2 See Jon 0. Newman, Not the End of History: The Second Circuit Struggles
With Fair Use, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOCY 12 (1989) (containing Judge Newman's
discussion of two fair use cases).
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